Closing the Strait of Hormuz: A Dangerous Necessity or a Strategic Illusion?
ROME: Few waterways carry as much geopolitical weight as the Strait of Hormuz. A narrow maritime corridor linking the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea, it is the artery through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil supply flows. Any disruption, let alone a deliberate closure, would reverberate instantly across global markets, energy security calculations, and military postures. And yet, in moments of escalating tension with Iran, the idea of closing Hormuz has re-emerged in strategic discourse, not as an act of desperation, but as a potential instrument of global security.
The argument is stark: if the Strait is being used directly or indirectly as leverage by a state engaged in destabilising behaviour, then temporarily restricting access could be framed as a pre-emptive measure to prevent wider conflict. In this view, closure is not an act of economic warfare against the world, but a containment strategy aimed at limiting escalation, curbing illicit flows, and reasserting control over a critical chokepoint.
At first glance, the logic has a certain appeal. Iran has long demonstrated its ability to threaten maritime traffic in the Gulf through asymmetric means mines, fast-attack craft, drone surveillance, and proxy operations. Even without a formal blockade, the mere perception of risk can drive up insurance costs, disrupt shipping schedules, and inject volatility into global energy markets. A controlled closure, proponents argue, could neutralise this ambiguity by replacing uncertainty with a clearly defined, internationally managed security regime.
Such a move would also send a powerful signal. It would demonstrate that strategic chokepoints cannot be weaponised without consequence, and that the international community retains both the will and the capability to act decisively when global commons are at risk. In an era where deterrence is increasingly tested across multiple domains; from cyber to maritime; the credibility of such responses carries weight beyond the immediate theatre.
But this is where the theory begins to fray.
Closing the Strait of Hormuz, even under the banner of security, would constitute one of the most disruptive actions imaginable in the modern global economy. Energy prices would spike within hours. Supply chains, already strained by years of geopolitical friction, would face renewed shocks. Import-dependent economies from Europe to South Asia would bear the brunt of the fallout, while energy producers might find themselves navigating both windfalls and instability.
More importantly, closure risks triggering exactly the kind of escalation it seeks to prevent. Iran would almost certainly interpret such a move as an act of aggression, potentially responding with broader regional actions targeting infrastructure, activating proxy networks, or expanding the conflict into adjacent theatres. What begins as a “controlled” measure could quickly spiral into an uncontrollable confrontation.
There is also the question of legality and legitimacy. The Strait of Hormuz is governed by international maritime law as a transit passage, meaning that ships of all nations enjoy the right of uninterrupted navigation. Any attempt to close it, even temporarily, would require not just military capability, but a robust legal and diplomatic framework to justify the action. Without broad international backing, such a move could fracture alliances rather than reinforce them.
And yet, the underlying concern that gives rise to these discussions is real. The vulnerability of global chokepoints, the increasing sophistication of asymmetric threats, and the strategic use of ambiguity by state and non-state actors all point to a maritime domain that is far from secure. The question is not whether action is needed, but what form that action should take.
A more viable approach may lie in enhanced security rather than outright closure: coordinated naval patrols, improved surveillance, stricter enforcement against illicit activities, and a clearer framework for collective response in the event of escalation. In other words, not the denial of access, but the reinforcement of order.
The temptation to consider dramatic measures like closing Hormuz reflects a broader anxiety about the erosion of control in key global systems. But in a world as interconnected as ours, the line between securing a chokepoint and destabilising the entire system is perilously thin.
Closing the Strait of Hormuz may appear, in moments of crisis, as a decisive solution. In reality, it is more likely to be a catalyst, one that transforms tension into confrontation, and risk into rupture. The challenge for policymakers is not to shut the artery, but to ensure that it continues to function without becoming a weapon in itself.
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