Pakistan’s jailed former prime minister Imran Khan has accused Army Chief Asim Munir of deliberately sabotaging relations with Afghanistan. In a statement carried by Indian and Afghan outlets, Khan said ties were “deliberately” pushed toward confrontation to please foreign lobbies opposed to the Taliban government in Kabul and to project the army chief as a savior to the West. He linked the charge to the expulsion of Afghan refugees and cross‑border military actions, calling instead for talks led by tribal communities and Afghan authorities. The claim, issued on September 16, comes as Khan remains behind bars and his party faces an ongoing crackdown.
The accusation lands at a tense moment. On one hand, Islamabad has taken steps to thaw relations with Kabul after years of strain. In late May, Pakistan announced it would appoint an ambassador to Afghanistan for the first time since the Taliban takeover in 2021, an upgrade from chargé-level ties that signals cautious engagement. On the other hand, both sides continue to trade accusations over militant sanctuaries and cross‑border attacks, and routine diplomatic contact has not stemmed violence along the frontier.
The borderlands are again absorbing the costs. Over the past week alone, Pakistan’s military said a series of raids near the Afghan frontier killed at least 45 militants; Pakistan also reported 19 soldiers dead in the operations. Independent reporting from the region described heavy fighting in Bajaur and South Waziristan, two districts that have swung between calm and conflict for two decades as security forces pressed the Tehreek‑e‑Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Islamabad argues the TTP exploits havens inside Afghanistan; Kabul rejects that claim. The cycle of strike and reprisal fuels the exact instability Khan says should be addressed through dialogue rather than force.
Humanitarian fallout from Pakistan’s deportation drive is grave and recent data are unambiguous. As of September 11, 2025, UNHCR records show 602,900 Afghans returned from Pakistan in 2025 alone, amid an intensified “Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan.” Since April, authorities have arrested more than 60,000 Afghans in Pakistan; in August, 87,200 returned PoR card holders registered refugees previously considered under protection. UNHCR warns that many returnees face serious risks inside Afghanistan, especially women and girls. The pressure has collided with Taliban restrictions on female aid workers: last week the UN shut eight returnee support centers because women staff were barred from entering, forcing daily assistance for thousands to a halt.
Khan’s charge also revives a deeper argument about the army’s central role in Pakistan’s statecraft. Pakistan’s military has long dominated security and foreign policy and, at crucial moments, domestic politics. A 2024 Brookings analysis described how the army’s “usual playbook” shaped the 2024 election environment and why Washington has often favored working through Rawalpindi to pursue regional goals. The same analysis notes America’s reliance on the army has not yielded stable politics at home.
Under Asim Munir, that dominance has widened into the economic sphere. The Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC) the country’s fast‑track investment forum, was designed as a joint civilian‑military project and is co‑chaired by the prime minister and the army chief. Supporters say the council cuts red tape; critics see an institutional path for the military to arbitrate capital and projects. Either way, it cements the army’s seat at the table well beyond defense.
Symbolism matters too. After a brief but serious India‑Pakistan flare‑up in May, the government promoted Munir to field marshal, a rare rank in Pakistan and a signal of the army’s unrivaled status. Al Jazeera reported that the move, justified as recognition for managing the confrontation, could further entrench the military’s primacy over civilian leadership. That promotion, coupled with visible public rallies and political prosecutions, is the backdrop against which Khan frames his allegation of institutional overreach into Afghan policy.
External players are shaping incentives in every sensitive region that touches Pakistan. The United States helped broker a ceasefire in the May India‑Pakistan crisis; within weeks, Munir was hosted at the White House an unusual degree of access that underscores Washington’s habit of engaging Pakistan’s army directly when the stakes are high. That same channel influences how Pakistan calibrates pressure and outreach toward Afghanistan, especially on counterterrorism issues that the U.S. still tracks closely.
China, meanwhile, is blunt about its interests. After repeated attacks on Chinese engineers and projects, President Xi pressed Pakistan this month to strengthen protection for Chinese nationals and Belt and Road assets. Beijing’s demands reach deep into Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa regions where refugee flows, militant networks, and army operations overlap. Security commitments made to China inevitably affect how troops and intelligence units are deployed along the Afghan frontier.
Pakistan has tightened the screws through deportations, border closures, and targeted strikes claiming a spike in TTP attacks traced to Afghan soil. At the same time, it has inched toward normalized diplomacy by restoring ambassador‑level ties and participating in China‑hosted dialogues with Afghan counterparts. The mix of pressure and engagement looks less like a single‑person strategy and more like a state response led by an institution that historically sets the parameters for Pakistan’s Afghan policy.
Khan’s core point that force alone won’t deliver peace matches warnings from humanitarian agencies and conflict researchers. UN figures show displacement, arrests, and rushed returns on a scale that local systems cannot absorb, especially with women aid workers sidelined inside Afghanistan. Fighting in the border belt persists despite operations and raids. In that environment, talks that include tribal communities, Kabul authorities, and Islamabad’s security leadership are not a concession; they are a necessity.
The army’s dominance ensures that any reset with Afghanistan will, in practice, run through Rawalpindi. That is the reality of Pakistan’s civil‑military order today. Whether this produces durable calm depends on two moves the record now urges: first, converting tactical pressure into a clear political track with Kabul; second, narrowing the military’s veto over domestic politics so civilian leaders can carry the cost of compromise. Without both, accusations like Khan’s will keep echoing, the border will keep burning, and outside powers from Washington to Beijing to Riyadh will continue to pull at Pakistan’s most sensitive seams.
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