Recently, Chinese authorities announced a “major victory” in their efforts to alleviate
poverty in Tibet. However, it’s crucial to take a closer look at how this anti-poverty
campaign has been executed, especially in light of recent reports suggesting that
coercive labour trainings, similar to those in Xinjiang, are being implemented in the
region.
As part of their poverty alleviation strategy, Beijing has introduced the so-called “labour
train and transfer” program in Tibet, primarily targeting Tibetan nomads and farmers.
According to Chinese officials, this training program, much like the ones in Xinjiang,
aims to equip Tibetan herders and farmers with new skills such as cooking and mining,
enabling them to earn a livelihood. However, the problem lies in the way this seemingly
well-intentioned policy is being enforced and the potential long-term negative
consequences it may have.
At first glance, there’s nothing wrong with a state lifting people out of poverty – it’s
something that should be applauded. But when there’s a hidden political agenda behind
it, things get problematic. This seems to be the case with China’s anti-poverty campaign
in Tibet. The campaign is heavily influenced by political and security motives, such as
ideological education and maintaining stability.
One of the main aspects of the labour training program starts with thought education.
Beijing argues that this is necessary to eliminate what they call the “negative influence
of religion” and to correct backward thinking. This involves side lining Tibetan spiritual
culture in favour of a money-centric mind-set. The idea is that Tibetans are poor
because their culture is considered backward, and to progress materially, they need to
adopt Chinese culture and systems. This colonial-style mission is being carried out by
an army of Communist Party cadres and security agents, including the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA).
The official justification for incorporating the military into labour training programs is to
enhance discipline and instil a sense of patriotism among the populace. This initiative is
supervised by local PLA garrisons and the People’s Armed Police. The involvement of
security agencies indicates that political motives overshadow economic or social
considerations. From a Foucauldian viewpoint, the objective is to create disciplined,
obedient workers and loyal colonial subjects. This approach underscores the
prioritization of political control and ideological conformity over genuine economic
development or social welfare.
Another aspect of the campaign involves relocating predominantly Tibetan nomads and
farmers from their ancestral lands to new settlement sites, purportedly to provide them
with better living conditions. According to Chinese authorities, around 266,000 nomads
and farmers have been moved to 960 new relocation areas. However, beyond the
official narrative, these relocated Tibetans are forced to abandon not only their lands but
also their traditional livelihoods and way of life.
Moreover, they must adapt to a system that operates under unfamiliar conditions. Their
survival skills as nomads or farmers are not applicable in a market dominated by
Chinese norms and practices, including laws and language. This creates significant
challenges for them, as they struggle to navigate and thrive in an environment that is
vastly different from what they have known. The difficulties they face extend far beyond
mere relocation.
Once relocated, individuals are subjected to various political classes and surveillance
measures. Each site has CCP members, known as residential work teams, who compile
dossiers on people, including their income, political views, and religious beliefs, to
assess their political trustworthiness.
This is accompanied by political education, covering Beijing’s policies on religion,
ethnicity, anti-separatism, and gratitude education. The residential work teams provide
ideological education to both large groups and smaller target groups. For instance, in
one relocation camp in Toklongdechen district near Lhasa, Chinese sources reported
that the work teams conducted 2,213 sessions on general political education and 1,063
anti-separatism sessions in 2018. Alongside this ideological education is a sophisticated
surveillance system designed to monitor thoughts and behaviours.
The new relocation structures for displaced nomads and farmers are designed with a
panoptic purpose, featuring a comprehensive surveillance system. Once relocated,
households are organized into a grid management system, with 10 to 15 families per
grid. They are required to report on each other, sharing their problems and views with a
CCP official overseeing the grid segment. This collective neighbourhood policing is
further reinforced by a high-tech surveillance system, including AI-powered facial
recognition cameras.
As a result, these relocation camps are more about control than comfort; they are more
automatic than autonomous. Instead of addressing poverty, they focus on political
instability. The relocation of nomads and farmers from their ancestral lands to train them
in low-skill jobs is not just about education; it’s about Sinicizing them. This approach is
far from empowering. It makes them more vulnerable to various contingencies, including
different forms of exploitation and deprivation.
The surveillance system ensures that every aspect of their lives is monitored, leaving
little room for personal freedom or autonomy. The grid management system creates an
environment of mistrust, as families are encouraged to report on each other. This not
only disrupts their traditional way of life but also instills a sense of fear and dependency
on the state. The emphasis on low-skill job training further marginalizes them, as they
are forced to abandon their traditional skills and adapt to a new way of life that is heavily
influenced by Chinese norms and practices. This transition is challenging and often
leaves them ill-equipped to thrive in their new environment, making them more
susceptible to exploitation and deprivation.
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