Since 2024 onwards there have been infrastructural, legal, and policy changes, which fundamentally changed the experience of the internet in Pakistan.
Pakistan’s surveillance trajectory shows a steady escalation from early mass‑monitoring to a sophisticated, multi‑layered digital control regime. A 2013 report by Citizen Lab revealed the presence of command-and-control servers for FinFisher, a commercial network intrusion malware capable of intercepting communications, accessing private data, and recording audio and video from computers or mobile devices in Pakistan. The server was employed on a network owned by the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL), a now-privatised state-owned entity, with 62 per cent government shareholding.
Beginning in the mid‑2000s, Pakistan acquired interception tools from companies like Alcatel, Ericsson, SS8, and Utimaco, while cooperating closely with the NSA through programmes such as Fairview and SKYNET, which harvested Pakistani telecom metadata and fed into drone‑targeting operations. By the late 2010s, spyware intrusions expanded, with The Guardian revealing that officials, journalists, and activists were hacked using Israeli malware, later traced to longstanding use of Cellebrite’s UFED tools by Pakistani agencies. This infrastructure deepened in the 2020s as Pakistan contracted Sandvine for an $18.5 million nationwide DPI‑based web monitoring system.Haaretz reported that the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) and various police units in Pakistan have been using the software since at least 2012. This infrastructure deepened in the 2020s as Pakistan contracted Sandvine for an $18.5 million nationwide DPI‑based web monitoring system and, by 2024, began testing a Chinese‑built national internet firewall capable of filtering platforms, blocking app features, and degrading connectivity. Across two decades, the pattern is clear: Pakistan has moved from fragmented surveillance partnerships to an integrated, state‑controlled censorship and monitoring apparatus spanning metadata harvesting, device intrusion, DPI filtering, and national‑level internet control.
In 2024, Pakistan tested a national internet ‘firewall’, using Chinese technology, which allowed the government to bolster its web monitoring capabilities and regulate the use of popular platforms by blocking specific features within an app or a website. It was deployed at the country’s main internet gateways, as well as the data centres of mobile service and major internet service providers, and triggered numerous complaints of poor internet connectivity.
Mere months after the controversial February 2024 general election, all telecom operators were mandated by the regulator to install what is known as the Lawful Intercept Management System (LIMS), giving intel agencies instant access to citizens’ call logs, private messages, browsing history and much more. The Lawful Intercept Management System is yet another surveillance mechanism employed by the Pakistani state, and can be used to retrieve the unencrypted data of any consumer, eavesdrop on their calls, and read text messages.
The Audio Leaks Case before the Islamabad High Court exposed how the state has been conducting mass, warrantless surveillance through LIMS. Testimony revealed that agencies could tap into telecom networks with a single click, using SIM, IMEI, or phone numbers to automatically pull SMS records, call data, metadata, and even full content streams audio, video, and search histories into central monitoring centres. Telecom companies were required to make up to 2% of their users available for surveillance, meaning more than four million citizens could be monitored without oversight. Despite this, the federal government denied authorising any surveillance under the laws that regulate interception, prompting the court to conclude that either no surveillance ever occurs (which is implausible) or that agencies are conducting it unlawfully. The court pointed to the steady stream of leaked recordings involving judges, politicians, and private citizens as evidence that high‑level offices are being monitored, calling the situation “frightening and damning” for a constitutional democracy and likening it to Orwell’s 1984.
The judgment underscored how Pakistan’s constitutional guarantees, privacy (Article 14), liberty (Article 9), and freedom of speech (Article 19) have been eroded by unchecked surveillance practices. It also highlighted a broader global pattern in which governments invoke national security to avoid scrutiny and justify expansive, discretionary powers. In Pakistan’s case, official claims of lacking surveillance capacity are contradicted by extensive public evidence, including Privacy International’s findings that the state has long possessed advanced spying tools and has cooperated with foreign intelligence agencies. While the government avoided accountability in this instance, the case has intensified concerns about institutional manipulation, the vulnerability of democratic institutions, and the urgent need for legal safeguards to prevent the misuse of surveillance technologies. Despite efforts by the Islamabad High Court to prevent abuse of surveillance powers, the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Bench removed the safeguards it had placed. It suspended the IHC’s order and has not heard the matter since December 2024.
From the deployment of a national “firewall” in recent years to the discovery of a “Lawful Intercept Management System”, user data and citizen privacy remain hostage to political ambitions and corporate collusion. A central component of this system is the Web Monitoring System (WMS 2.0), described as a powerful national firewall capable of blocking websites, VPNs, and entire platforms while using deep packet inspection to analyze and filter internet traffic. According to The Diplomat, WMS 2.0 allows authorities to restrict or shut down internet access and monitor online activity across the country. This infrastructure is complemented by Pakistan’s frequent use of internet blackouts, which serve as a blunt instrument to suppress protests, political mobilization, and public dissent.
Disproportionate Violations:
Pakistan’s 2024 elections unfolded under an environment of extraordinary digital intrusion, where authorities relied on network shutdowns, targeted throttling, and expanded surveillance to manage political dissent. The February 8, 2024, shut down on the day of the general election that led to a controversial election result, largely because election officials could not upload the results within the stipulated time. Internet blackouts in major cities on election day framed as “security measures”cut off millions from communication, election information, and reporting channels. X, formerly Twitter, was blocked without any notice or justification on February 17, 2024, soon after evidence of rigging in the February 8 election started being shared on the platform, and the Rawalpindi commissioner held a press conference admitting to receiving orders to rig the election. The government also started blocking several VPNs in Pakistan starting in late February. A few months on, the IT Minister for State Shaza Fatima hilariously blamed VPNs for slow internet speeds, followed by PTA Chairperson Major General (retired) Hafeez Ur Rehman saying on September 8 that unregistered VPNs would be blocked.
Even as The audio leaks case in the Islamabad High Court filed by Bushra Bibi tracked the violation of law by intelligence agencies in the interception of phone calls and messages, the federal government issued a gazette notification, authorising the ISI to intercept calls and messages or trace calls through any telecommunication system. This notification was challenged in the Lahore High Court as well as the Sindh High Court, but remains in effect, legalising mass surveillance without a warrant.
Encrypted messaging app Signal was blocked, WhatsApp and Instagram disrupted, internet suspended in areas of Lahore, and VPNs were blocked nationwide on November 10. new social media platform BlueSky was blocked in Pakistan, one of the first countries to make the move.Mobile and internet services were disrupted again on November 25 and 26 due to the PTI’s protest in Islamabad. In Balochistan unannounced digital blackouts have persisted in several areas since late 2024. In fact, the disruptions caught so much global attention that the global #KeepItOn coalition issued a statement on December 12, asking authorities in Pakistan to stop suppressing digital rights.
Mobile and internet services in Pakistan‑occupied Jammu & Kashmir (PoJK) were suspended in late September 2025 amid mass protests, strikes, and escalating unrest in Muzaffarabad, Bagh, and Rawalakot. The blackout, ordered under federal instructions, disrupted communications for thousands of residents and drew sharp criticism from local leaders who described it as pushing Kashmiris into a “dead end.”
Under ICCPR Article 17, such blanket disruptions constitute arbitrary interference: they are imposed without transparent legal basis, affect entire populations rather than specific threats, and disproportionately restrict the ability of voters, journalists, and observers to participate freely in the democratic process.
What Global Watchdogs are saying about ‘Internet Freedoms’ or Lack thereof in Pakistan:
Human Rights Watch’s World Report 2025 paints a stark picture of Pakistan’s tightening digital repression. In 2024 alone, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) ordered more than fifty internet shutdowns, often coinciding with protests, elections, or security incidents. These blackouts carried a heavy economic toll, with independent monitors estimating losses exceeding one billion dollars in GDP, as e‑commerce, banking, and gig‑economy livelihoods were disrupted. At the same time, amendments to the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) expanded state surveillance powers, enabling the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) to access the data of over 100 million users through its Lawful Intercept Management System (LIMS). This infrastructure has been used to profile individuals deemed “anti‑state,” raising alarm among rights groups about arbitrary targeting and erosion of privacy. The combined effect has been a surge in self‑censorship: journalists, activists, and ordinary citizens increasingly refrain from expressing dissent online, fearing legal harassment or surveillance. HRW warns that these practices not only undermine fundamental freedoms but also drain Pakistan’s economy and shrink civic space, positioning the country as one of South Asia’s most restrictive digital environments.
Pakistan has been ranked 27th out of 100 classifying as ‘Not Free’ in terms of internet freedom by a global democracy watchdog Freedom House in its recent report, which cited government measures to expand censorship practices. During June 1, 2024 to May 31, 2025, the report issued by the US-based Freedom House noted that the authorities threatened to block virtual private networks (VPNs) and adopted amendments to the country’s cybercrime law that rights groups said could be abused. Freedom House’s assessment paints a picture of tightening internet controls in Pakistan, driven largely by political tensions and the military establishment’s efforts to limit the influence of former prime minister Imran Khan and his party. Throughout the year, authorities expanded censorship practices, threatened VPN bans, and introduced amendments to cybercrime laws that rights groups warned could be misused. Internet restrictions intensified during politically sensitive moments most notably in November 2024, when connectivity in Islamabad was curtailed amid mass protests supporting Khan, who remained imprisoned throughout the period.
Freedom House notes that users across the country experienced recurring disruptions to WhatsApp, Signal, and other platforms, with researchers linking these outages to the rollout of new website‑monitoring and blocking technologies. Meanwhile, the government’s approach to platform control remained inconsistent: X (formerly Twitter), blocked since February 2024, was suddenly restored in May 2025 during a brief Pakistan‑India military conflict, even as the platform became a major source of misinformation, including from accounts tied to the Pakistani state. Authorities also repeatedly threatened to block unregistered VPNs under new rules requiring disclosure of user identities, but ultimately backed down after the Law Ministry concluded that the government lacked the legal authority to enforce such a ban. Overall, the assessment underscores a year marked by politically motivated restrictions, expanding surveillance capabilities, and an increasingly fragile environment for digital rights. “The military exerts enormous influence over the conduct of elections, government formation, and policies; intimidates the media; and enjoys impunity for indiscriminate or extralegal use of force,” it added.
Amnesty International in a new, ominously titled report, ‘Shadows of Control: Censorship and Mass Surveillance in Pakistan’ examines the massive snooping capabilities that the Pakistani authorities now possess and warns of their many dangers. The investigation exposes how Pakistani authorities have obtained technology from foreign companies, through a covert global supply chain of sophisticated surveillance and censorship tools, particularly the new firewall (the Web Monitoring System [WMS 2.0]) and a Lawful Intercept Management System (LIMS) “Chinese, European, Emirati and North American companies” have provided the technology for this system, according to Amnesty, and the Pakistani state is using it without any legal checks in place.
“Pakistan’s Web Monitoring System and Lawful Intercept Management System operate like watchtowers, constantly snooping on the lives of ordinary citizens. In Pakistan, your texts, emails, calls and internet access are all under scrutiny. But people have no idea of this constant surveillance, and its incredible reach. This dystopian reality is extremely dangerous because it operates in the shadows, severely restricting freedom of expression and access to information,” reports Agnès Callamard, Secretary General at Amnesty International.
Amnesty Internationals’ year long report says, “Concerns around unlawful surveillance and online censorship in Pakistan are longstanding. Under an oppressive political landscape, the country’s legal system offers no real protection against mass surveillance. Domestic laws lack safeguards and those that exist, such as warrant requirements under the Fair Trial Act, are often ignored, while authorities acquire ever more sophisticated surveillance and censorship tools from foreign companies. The purchase of these sophisticated technologies has amplified the country’s capacity to silence dissent, including by targeting journalists, civil society and the public.”
Writing for The Diplomat, Islamabad-based journalist Osama Ahmad reported that LIMS is integrated directly into telecom networks, giving authorities the ability to monitor more than four million citizens using foreign‑supplied interception tools. This creates a centralized mechanism for tracking journalists, activists, political opponents, and ordinary citizens.
Furthermore, Pakistan recorded the highest financial losses worldwide from internet and social media shutdowns in the past year, with disruptions costing the country an estimated $1.62 billion. This figure surpassed even war‑torn states such as Sudan and Myanmar, underscoring the severe economic toll of Pakistan’s censorship practices. According to a report by Top10VPN.com, global internet disruptions collectively lasted 88,788 hours in 2024, resulting in losses of $7.69 billion. Pakistan’s outsized share of this total highlights how politically motivated outages have become not only a rights issue but also a significant drag on the national economy.
Legal Duties and International Standards
Pakistan, having ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 2010, is bound to uphold the rights to freedom of expression, privacy, and access to information. Under the ICCPR and successive Universal Periodic Review (UPR) recommendations, internet shutdowns must be strictly limited to exceptional circumstances, applied with necessity and proportionality, and never used as a blanket tool to suppress dissent.
Likewise, surveillance mechanisms such as the Lawful Intercept Management System (LIMS) and Web Monitoring System (WMS) require judicial oversight, with warrants mandated to prevent arbitrary intrusion into citizens’ communications.
To meet its treaty commitments, Pakistan must institute structural reforms that bring its digital policies into compliance with ICCPR and UPR benchmarks. This includes establishing transparent audits of the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority’s (PTA) surveillance practices, ensuring accountability for shutdown orders, and decriminalizing the use of VPNs and other digital tools that facilitate secure communication. International standards emphasize that such technologies are essential for journalists, activists, and ordinary citizens to exercise their rights safely.
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