NEW DELHI: When Riyadh and Islamabad unveiled their Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) on 17 September 2025, headlines suggested the birth of a new Gulf security axis. The pact’s language — that any aggression against one would be treated as aggression against the other — sounded dramatic in a region unsettled by shifting U.S. commitments, Israeli assertiveness and Iranian manoeuvres. For many, the question arose immediately: would this deal shake the carefully nurtured partnership between India and Saudi Arabia?
Such anxiety misses the deeper story. The SMDA is less a geopolitical earthquake than a codification of an old bargain: Saudi Arabia outsourcing military skills it prefers not to develop internally, and Pakistan monetising its dwindling strategic assets to stay solvent. India’s relationship with Riyadh rests on far stronger foundations — deep energy interdependence, an investment-rich economic future under Vision 2030, advanced cooperation in technology and green hydrogen, and the lived presence of more than 2.7 million Indian migrants powering Saudi Arabia’s economy and modernisation drive. Seen through this prism, the pact says more about Pakistan’s fiscal desperation and Riyadh’s risk-averse security culture than about any erosion of Indo–Saudi trust. Far from threatening India, it underlines how the India–Saudi partnership has matured into one of Asia’s most resilient, forward-looking relationships, built to endure well beyond the tactical manoeuvres of other players in West Asia.
Gulf monarchies face a long-standing paradox: wealthy enough to procure advanced weaponry yet wary of building strong, independent armed forces that could threaten regime survival. History across the Middle East is full of generals who turned their arms against rulers. Saudi Arabia, acutely aware of this risk, has kept its military deliberately constrained, relying on external manpower to fill critical gaps. For decades Pakistan has been the preferred supplier — training Saudi pilots, guarding oil facilities and intervening during the 1979 Grand Mosque crisis. The SMDA formalises this practice; it does not transform it.
Pakistan’s incentives are equally clear. The economy is fragile, dependent on IMF programmes and periodic Saudi bailouts. Islamabad repeatedly seeks deferred oil payments, deposits and humanitarian assistance. In addition, the country struggles with recurrent catastrophic floods, which have destroyed infrastructure and deepened fiscal stress — further driving Islamabad to monetise whatever strategic assets it retains. By offering troops and the symbolic aura of a nuclear weapons state, it tries to secure rents and diplomatic relevance. Even then, the pact is carefully phrased: “aggression” rather than “attack” preserves Saudi discretion and avoids binding commitments. Pakistan’s foreign policy — staunchly anti-Israel, sometimes leaning towards Iran — and its domestic instability further erode its credibility as a security guarantor.
Saudi procurement patterns reinforce this logic. The Kingdom is among the world’s largest arms buyers, importing advanced aircraft, missiles and precision systems to maintain ties with Washington and project prestige. Yet it lacks enough trained personnel to operate and maintain this arsenal. Pakistani officers and technicians bridge that gap. The SMDA keeps this arrangement functional; it does not redefine Riyadh’s grand strategy.
India operates on a different track. New Delhi does not export collective defence guarantees or station forces to protect other regimes. Its strategic culture values autonomy and avoids entangling alliances. Instead, India projects influence through economic statecraft, advanced technology and discreet but credible security dialogue. This means Riyadh can hire Pakistani manpower while simultaneously deepening a partnership with India that is economic, technological and future-oriented.
Energy remains the backbone: Saudi Arabia is consistently among India’s top three crude suppliers and bilateral trade now exceeds US$42 billion annually. But the relationship extends far beyond oil. India has become a partner of choice in Riyadh’s ambitious Vision 2030, which seeks to diversify the Saudi economy into smart cities, advanced industry and sustainable energy. Indian engineering and IT majors contribute to mega-projects such as NEOM City, while Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund enjoys preferential access to Indian markets — signalling trust and long-term interdependence. Clean energy adds a new strategic layer. Saudi Arabia aims to be a global hub for green hydrogen as part of its low-carbon transition; India, with ambitious renewable goals and competitive hydrogen production costs, is a natural collaborator. Joint initiatives under the International Solar Alliance and bilateral energy dialogues are already shaping a post-oil partnership grounded in technology and markets.
Diplomatic engagement has matched these structural shifts. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to New Delhi for the 2023 G20 Summit, his co-chairing of the India–Saudi Strategic Partnership Council with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and the launch of the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) have positioned India at the heart of Saudi connectivity planning. IMEC promises to redraw trade routes linking Asia, the Gulf and Europe. Riyadh values India’s vast market, engineering expertise and non-hegemonic strategic style — attractive as the Kingdom hedges among great powers without surrendering autonomy.
Nearly 2.7 million Indian migrants work in Saudi Arabia, powering hospitals, infrastructure, logistics and technology while sending vital remittances home. For Saudi Arabia, this skilled workforce is indispensable to its modernisation; for India, it represents both economic and soft-power leverage. Centuries of maritime trade and religious pilgrimage further bind the two societies. Riyadh’s repeated expansion of India’s Hajj quota underscores a reservoir of goodwill untouched by defence deals.
The idea that Riyadh must choose between India and Pakistan reflects an outdated zero-sum frame. Saudi Arabia is practising multi-alignment: keeping U.S. defence links, courting Chinese investment, exploring quiet understandings with Israel, hiring Pakistani manpower, and deepening economic and technological ties with India. New Delhi, meanwhile, has long pursued a de-hyphenated West Asia policy, treating Riyadh on its own merit rather than through Islamabad. India’s calm response to the SMDA reflects mature confidence in this differentiated and durable partnership.
For Indian diplomacy the right response is strategic patience combined with proactive consolidation: accelerate participation in Vision 2030 and NEOM infrastructure; expand cooperation in green hydrogen and renewables; safeguard the rights and welfare of Indian migrants; and drive forward connectivity projects such as IMEC. Quiet maritime security and intelligence exchanges should continue without turning the relationship into a formal alliance — consistent with India’s tradition of non-intervention and strategic autonomy.
The deeper lesson is that West Asian geopolitics can no longer be understood through a Cold War lens of rigid, zero-sum alliances. Saudi Arabia can outsource manpower and symbolic deterrence to Pakistan while looking to India for markets, capital, advanced technology and leadership in the green energy transition. India, in turn, secures reliable energy partners, investment flows, next-generation connectivity and protection for its citizens abroad without being drawn into volatile military commitments. The SMDA may command headlines, but it does not alter the region’s strategic geometry. The enduring reality is that India and Saudi Arabia are building a sophisticated and resilient partnership — pragmatic on security, expansive in trade, visionary in energy and technology, and deeply anchored in historical and human ties. As Riyadh moves beyond oil and single-power dependence, and as New Delhi asserts itself as a civilisational yet forward-looking Asian actor, the two countries are shaping an interdependent future that short-term defence pacts elsewhere cannot easily disrupt.
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Dr. Maheep
Dr. Maheep is Director, Indian Perspective on Global Affairs (IPGA), and a leading analyst of India’s foreign policy and South Asian geopolitics. He earned his PhD in Arab and Islamic Studies. With more than a decade of teaching and research experience in International Relations and Global Politics, he contributes regularly on issues shaping national and global affairs.
