Bangladesh on the Tightrope: One Hundred Days of Democratic Governance in a Fractured World
For most newly elected governments, the first hundred days represent a honeymoon period a window of goodwill, bold promises, and carefully staged beginnings. Bangladesh’s new democratic government, however, was afforded no such luxury. From the moment it assumed office, it was thrust into the turbulent currents of a world in profound disorder, forced to navigate crises not of its own making before it could even begin to articulate a coherent vision for the future.
The reverberations of conflict around Iran and the broader instability engulfing the Gulf region have struck Bangladesh with particular force. As a nation heavily dependent on imported fuel, liquefied natural gas, and fertilisers, the country is acutely vulnerable to disruptions in global energy markets. The government moved swiftly to secure alternative supply arrangements, accepting short-term debt obligations to stabilise the situation a pragmatic response under the circumstances, though one that defers rather than resolves the underlying structural fragility of an import-dependent economy. The harder question, which policymakers must eventually confront, is how Bangladesh builds long-term energy resilience in an era of chronic geopolitical volatility.
Beyond the immediate economic strain, the Gulf crisis has cast a long shadow over the millions of Bangladeshi migrant workers employed across the Middle East. Their remittances form a critical pillar of the national economy, and any sustained disruption to their livelihoods would ripple through households and foreign exchange reserves alike. That the protection of this vast and vulnerable diaspora has not yet emerged as a defined diplomatic priority is a gap that deserves urgent attention. Labour diplomacy, too often treated as a secondary concern, must be elevated to the front ranks of Bangladesh’s foreign policy architecture.
It is within this context of external pressure that the new government has been compelled to define its international posture and the posture it has chosen is one of studied equidistance. The guiding principle, broadly described as a “Bangladesh First” foreign policy, seeks to engage all major powers without subordinating national interest to any single patron. In the fractious landscape of South Asian geopolitics, where great power competition has grown sharper and the costs of misalignment more severe, this is not merely a diplomatic preference it is a strategic necessity.
The relationship with India remains the most complex and consequential bilateral equation Bangladesh must manage. The early signals from the new government have been deliberately conciliatory. The decision to make New Delhi the first major bilateral destination for the foreign minister before Beijing carried a clear symbolic message: that Dhaka values the relationship and seeks to repair the strains that had accumulated during the preceding transitional period. Yet goodwill alone cannot substitute for substantive progress on the issues that matter most. The unresolved questions of river water sharing most notably the long-delayed Teesta agreement and the renewal of the Ganges water treaty are not abstract diplomatic disputes. They determine the agricultural viability of vast regions and the livelihoods of millions of ordinary citizens. Until these are addressed through durable, equitable arrangements, the warmth of diplomatic exchanges will remain somewhat hollow.
The emergence of a politically unified administration across both New Delhi and West Bengal does, in principle, create a more favourable structural environment for bilateral progress. The removal of a key domestic political obstacle on the Indian side offers a window of opportunity that Bangladesh’s diplomats would be wise to pursue with both urgency and patience. At the same time, the deployment of anti-Bangladesh rhetoric in recent Indian state election campaigns which prompted Dhaka to formally summon the Indian Deputy High Commissioner serves as a reminder that the relationship remains susceptible to domestic political pressures on both sides of the border.
Bangladesh’s engagement with China presents a different set of complexities. Beijing remains the country’s largest partner in infrastructure and development financing, and the relationship carries genuine economic significance. However, the proposed Chinese involvement in the Teesta River management project introduces a dimension of strategic sensitivity that cannot be ignored. The risk that deeper Chinese engagement on a transboundary river could provoke retaliatory water management decisions upstream by India is not hypothetical it is a scenario grounded in the logic of regional rivalry. Bangladesh must therefore approach this project with exceptional care, ensuring that economic benefit does not come at the cost of a deteriorating relationship with its most immediate and consequential neighbour.
More broadly, the challenge of balancing relations between Washington and Beijing the defining geopolitical fault line of our era will test the limits of Bangladesh’s diplomatic dexterity. The new government has chosen to honour the reciprocal trade agreement, the purchase of Boeing aircraft, and the gas supply deal concluded by its predecessor, signalling continuity and reliability to its American partners. These are defensible choices, given the scale of the United States’ influence over international financial institutions and the significance of the American market for Bangladeshi exports. Yet critics are right to note that certain provisions of the trade agreement may constrain Bangladesh’s commercial freedom with other partners, including China and Russia. A democratic parliament is precisely the institution through which such consequential commitments should be scrutinised and, if necessary, renegotiated.
The decision to proceed with Boeing aircraft while an Airbus proposal remains unresolved has also introduced an element of friction with European partners a friction that may seem minor in isolation but could complicate Bangladesh’s most pressing European priority. The country’s graduation from Least Developed Country status makes securing GSP Plus trade preferences from the European Union an economic imperative of the first order. Europe absorbs nearly thirty billion dollars’ worth of Bangladeshi exports annually, and the preferential access that underpins much of that trade cannot be taken for granted. Maintaining the confidence of Brussels while deepening ties with Washington requires a level of diplomatic finesse that demands consistent, high-level attention.
One aspect of the government’s international conduct has attracted pointed criticism at home: the foreign minister’s frequent overseas travel in pursuit of Bangladesh’s candidacy for the presidency of the United Nations General Assembly. Supporters argue, with some justification, that a successful bid would enhance Bangladesh’s international standing and amplify its voice on global issues. Sceptics, however, raise a more uncomfortable question whether the pursuit of institutional prestige is an appropriate allocation of diplomatic energy at a moment when the country faces acute economic pressures and its citizens abroad are confronting genuine hardship. The tension between symbolic diplomacy and substantive diplomacy is not unique to Bangladesh, but it is one that governments neglect at their peril.
There are, moreover, several issues of profound importance that have yet to receive the diplomatic attention they deserve. The Rohingya crisis which has burdened Bangladesh with one of the world’s largest refugee populations shows no signs of resolution, and international attention has drifted elsewhere. A sustainable pathway to repatriation, built on genuine multilateral engagement, remains elusive. Climate diplomacy is another arena where Bangladesh’s voice should carry particular moral authority, given that the country ranks among the most climate-vulnerable on earth. And the long-term institutional reform of the foreign ministry itself its capacity, coordination, and professional depth is a prerequisite for the kind of sophisticated, multi-vector diplomacy that Bangladesh’s strategic position demands.
One hundred days is, of course, an insufficient basis for definitive judgement. Governments are built over years, not weeks, and foreign policy frameworks take time to mature into coherent doctrine. What can be said with reasonable confidence is that the new government has demonstrated a pragmatic instinct prioritising economic diplomacy over ideological positioning, seeking engagement over confrontation, and attempting to hold the centre in a region where centrifugal forces are powerful and unforgiving.
The ambition to be neither in one camp nor another to chart an independent course that serves Bangladesh’s own interests in a world of competing giants is both admirable and enormously difficult. It requires not only diplomatic skill but institutional strength, democratic accountability, and the willingness to make difficult choices transparently. A government that came to power on a mandate for reform cannot afford to let the pressures of global crisis become a permanent excuse for deferred governance.
Bangladesh stands at a genuinely consequential moment in its history. The tightrope it walks is real, and the stakes on either side are high. Whether it crosses that rope with grace and purpose will depend not only on the acuity of its diplomats, but on the depth of its democratic foundations and on the courage of a government willing to be honest with its people about both the challenges ahead and the choices that must be made.
Views: 20
Shahidul Alam Swapan
Shahidul Alam Swapan is aSwitzerland-based Private Banking & Financial Crime Compliance Expert, Columnist and Poet.
