Security without trust- Pakistan’s Hard State and the Limits of International Credibility
On June 22, 2026, an anti-terrorism court in Quetta sentenced Mahrang Baloch, one of Pakistan’s most internationally recognized human rights defenders, to life imprisonment. The verdict immediately drew renewed criticism from international human rights organizations and reignited concerns over the trajectory of Pakistan’s rule of law. Yet the case is more than another controversial prosecution of a prominent activist. It has become perhaps the clearest illustration of how Pakistan’s “Hard State” doctrine is evolving from a counterterrorism strategy into a broader model of governance.
This transformation did not emerge overnight. On March 18, 2025, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Field Marshal Asim Munir, publicly introduced the concept of the “Hard State,” arguing that Pakistan required a stronger and more decisive state to confront terrorism, restore internal security, and reinforce state authority. The timing was far from coincidental. His remarks came just one week after the March 11, 2025 hijacking of the Jaffar Express in Balochistan, when militants from the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) seized the train and held hundreds of passengers hostage in one of Pakistan’s deadliest terrorist incidents in recent years.Only four days after Munir’s announcement, however, the country’s most internationally recognized Baloch activist was arrested during a police raid on a peaceful sit-in in Quetta. Fifteen months later, she was sentenced to life imprisonment under Pakistan’s anti-terrorism legislation. The sequence of these events raises a broader question. The “Hard State” doctrine was introduced as a response to armed militancy. Yet within little more than a year, some of its most visible applications have involved internationally recognized human rights defenders rather than armed militant organizations.The central question, therefore, is not simply whether Pakistan’s “Hard State” can strengthen national security. It is whether such a doctrine can remain compatible with the institutional credibility that Pakistan seeks to preserve in its relations with the European Union and other democratic partners.The first major test of Pakistan’s new security doctrine did not involve an armed militant organization. Instead, it centered on one of the country’s most prominent human rights advocates.The Baloch activist was far from an obscure public figure when she was arrested. In October 2024, she was included in TIME magazine’s TIME100 Next list, recognizing emerging global leaders shaping the future. Two months later, the BBC named her among its 100 Women, acknowledging her work documenting enforced disappearances and advocating for victims of human rights abuses in Balochistan.For years, her activism focused on allegations of enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and broader patterns of abuse in Pakistan’s largest province—issues that have consistently placed the authorities at odds with domestic and international human rights organizations. That international recognition transformed her subsequent prosecution from a domestic legal case into an issue carrying wider diplomatic significance.Nevertheless, only four days after the public launch of the “Hard State” doctrine, she was arrested during a police operation targeting a peaceful sit-in in Quetta following the fatal shooting of demonstrators by security forces a day earlier. On June 22, 2026, an anti-terrorism court sentenced her to life imprisonment on terrorism-related charges.The prosecution alone cannot determine how Pakistan’s “Hard State” doctrine is being implemented. It does, however, represent the first and most emblematic case through which the doctrine’s practical application can be examined. More importantly, it raises a question that extends well beyond a single judicial proceeding: where does the boundary lie between legitimate counterterrorism policy and the criminalization of peaceful political dissent?The significance of that question becomes even greater when this case is viewed alongside a growing number of prosecutions involving lawyers, civil society leaders, and other human rights defenders. Considered together, these developments invite a broader examination of whether Pakistan’s evolving security doctrine is being applied solely against violent extremism or is gradually reshaping the relationship between national security, civil liberties, and the rule of law.The prosecution of Pakistan’s most prominent Baloch activist does not appear to be an isolated development. Rather, it forms part of a broader pattern in which lawyers, civil society leaders, journalists, and human rights defenders have increasingly faced severe criminal charges, often under legislation originally designed to combat terrorism and protect national security.This broader trend is reflected in the case of Imaan Zainab Mazari-Hazir, one of Pakistan’s best-known human rights lawyers, and her husband, Hadi Ali Chattha. In January 2026, both were arrested and subsequently sentenced to 17 years in prison. Mazari had been among the most outspoken advocates calling for the activist’s release. While imprisoned, she and Chattha were awarded the Ludovic Trarieux International Human Rights Prize in June 2026—one of the world’s oldest and most prestigious distinctions honoring lawyers who defend human rights, first awarded to Nelson Mandela in 1985.Although the two prosecutions differ in their factual circumstances and legal basis, they share an important characteristic. Both involve internationally recognized figures whose human rights work had already attracted significant global attention before they became the subjects of serious criminal proceedings. Consequently, these cases are no longer viewed solely as domestic judicial matters. Increasingly, they are being interpreted abroad as indicators of Pakistan’s broader institutional trajectory.Those concerns have been echoed repeatedly by international organizations, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), and United Nations Special Rapporteurs. Over several years, these bodies have documented allegations of enforced disappearances, secret detentions, torture, restrictions on civic space, and the use of anti-terrorism legislation against human rights defenders, particularly in Balochistan.No single case is sufficient to define the direction of a country’s political system. Viewed collectively, however—and considered alongside the consistent findings of international human rights mechanisms—these developments reveal a pattern that is becoming increasingly difficult to dismiss. More importantly, that pattern is no longer relevant only to Pakistan’s domestic politics. It is beginning to influence how the country is assessed by governments, investors, international organizations, and democratic partners whose political and economic engagement increasingly reflects expectations regarding institutional resilience, judicial independence, and the protection of fundamental freedoms.Understanding this debate requires looking beyond questions of civil liberties alone. Balochistan is not simply the epicenter of Pakistan’s longest-running internal insurgency. It is also one of South Asia’s most strategically significant regions.The province is home to Gwadar, the deep-sea port that serves as the maritime gateway of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Beijing’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative project. Located on the Arabian Sea near the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz, Gwadar occupies a strategic position connecting the Middle East, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean. As a result, stability in Balochistan carries implications far beyond Pakistan’s domestic security.This broader geopolitical significance explains why developments in the province attract increasing international attention. For China, Balochistan is central to the success of CPEC. For India, it forms part of the wider regional security environment. For the United States and European countries, it intersects with concerns over maritime security, regional stability, energy routes, and the evolving balance of power across the Indo-Pacific.Seen from this perspective, the debate surrounding Pakistan’s “Hard State” doctrine extends well beyond domestic governance. It touches upon the political stability of one of the most strategically contested regions linking South Asia, the Middle East, and the wider Indo-Pacific. Consequently, questions regarding governance, institutional resilience, and the rule of law are increasingly viewed not only as internal matters but also as factors influencing Pakistan’s geopolitical credibility and its long-term relationships with international partners.The developments outlined above raise a broader question that extends beyond Pakistan itself. Increasingly, they test not only Islamabad’s domestic governance but also the European Union’s approach toward strategically important partners whose geopolitical relevance coexists with persistent concerns over democratic governance and institutional performance.This tension is particularly visible in the European Union’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+). Often described primarily as a preferential trade arrangement, GSP+ is, in reality, one of the European Union’s principal foreign policy instruments for promoting long-term institutional reform. Continued preferential access to the European market depends upon the effective implementation of 27 international conventions covering human rights, labour standards, environmental protection, good governance, and the rule of law. Unlike conventional trade agreements, GSP+ explicitly links economic benefits to sustained institutional commitments.From that perspective, high-profile prosecutions involving internationally recognised human rights defenders inevitably acquire significance beyond Pakistan’s domestic legal system. They become part of a wider international assessment of whether the country’s institutional trajectory remains consistent with the commitments underpinning its privileged relationship with the European Union.Yet Pakistan’s relationship with Europe cannot be understood solely through the lens of democratic conditionality. It is equally shaped by regional security, migration, counterterrorism cooperation, economic interests, and broader geopolitical considerations.Former Greek Ambassador Alexandros Mallias argues that this reality has long defined Europe’s engagement with strategically important states. As he observed during an interview for this article, “Europe maintains relations with Pakistan out of interest, not out of affection.” In his assessment, Pakistan’s strategic relevance—stemming from its geographic position, its role in regional security, and its importance in South Asian geopolitics—means that European engagement inevitably reflects considerations extending well beyond questions of domestic governance.Mallias further notes that European foreign policy is rarely driven by institutional principles alone. While the European Union formally conditions instruments such as GSP+ on compliance with international conventions, major member states frequently pursue their own strategic and economic priorities through bilateral relationships. Consequently, the implementation of European conditionality takes place within a broader framework of political realism rather than in isolation from geopolitical interests.This perspective does not diminish the importance of democratic governance or institutional accountability. Rather, it highlights the central policy dilemma confronting European decision-makers. The question is not whether the European Union should maintain relations with Pakistan. Given Pakistan’s geopolitical significance, continued engagement is highly likely. The more difficult question is whether the balance between strategic necessity and institutional conditionality can remain credible if concerns regarding judicial independence, civic freedoms, and governance standards continue to accumulate.Ultimately, this is not only Pakistan’s dilemma. It is increasingly becoming Europe’s as well. The credibility of GSP+ depends not only on the willingness of partner countries to implement their commitments but also on the European Union’s ability to demonstrate that those commitments remain meaningful even when applied to strategically important states.Pakistan’s “Hard State” doctrine was introduced as a strategy for restoring security in the face of persistent terrorist threats. Whether it ultimately succeeds, however, will not be judged solely by its effectiveness against militant violence. It will also be judged by its ability to preserve the institutional safeguards that distinguish legitimate counterterrorism from the criminalization of peaceful political dissent.The cases examined in this article do not, by themselves, define Pakistan’s future. Taken together, however, they raise legitimate questions about the direction in which the country’s security doctrine is evolving and whether the balance between state authority and individual freedoms is gradually being redefined.That dilemma extends beyond Pakistan. As former Greek Ambassador Alexandros Mallias observed during an interview for this article, “Europe maintains relations with Pakistan out of interest, not out of affection.” His assessment reflects an enduring principle of international politics: strategic engagement is often driven by geopolitical necessity rather than by convergence of political values. Pakistan’s geographic position, regional role, and security relevance ensure that it will remain an important partner for both the European Union and the wider West.Yet strategic necessity is only one side of the equation. During her tenure as European Union Ambassador to Pakistan, Androulla Kaminara consistently argued that democracy, the rule of law, and respect for fundamental rights are essential foundations for sustainable development and lasting prosperity. That principle also underpins the European Union’s GSP+ framework, which seeks to align economic partnership with continued progress in governance and institutional reform.The challenge facing Europe, therefore, is not whether it should continue engaging with Pakistan. It almost certainly will. The more consequential question is whether the European Union can continue to reconcile geopolitical realism with the institutional standards that form the basis of its external policy. The credibility of GSP+ ultimately depends not only on the commitments undertaken by partner countries, but also on the consistency with which those commitments are assessed.If the “Hard State” continues to blur the distinction between counterterrorism and peaceful dissent, the doctrine risks strengthening the coercive capacity of the state while weakening the very institutions upon which Pakistan’s long-term legitimacy—and its credibility with democratic partners—ultimately depends.In the end, the first real test of Pakistan’s “Hard State” may not be whether it defeats insurgency. It will be whether it can demonstrate that national security and democratic governance reinforce one another rather than compete. The answer to that question will shape not only Pakistan’s domestic future, but also the confidence with which Europe chooses to deepen its long-term partnership with the country.
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Dimitra Staikou
Dimitra Staikou is a Greek lawyer, human rights advocate . She works as a journalist writing about human right's violations in South Asia and ctravels to India to get informed about the political situation there and the geopolitcs between India,China ,Pakistan and Bangladesh. She works for Greece's biggest newspaper Skai.gr and Huffpost.Gr as well as international distinguised news sites as Modern Diplomacy and Global Research.
