What was once a distant question has become undeniable: is the Western world’s overconfidence in liberal democracy exacting a cost in the face of China’s expanding espionage? Recent evidence suggests the answer is unmistakably yes. While Western democracies remain open societies vulnerable to infiltration, China operates behind an iron curtain — a closed system that denies reciprocal access. This asymmetry has created a strategic imbalance, allowing Beijing to exploit the openness of liberal democracies while shielding itself from scrutiny.
In July, Belgian authorities arrested a Canadian woman of Chinese origin, accusing her of spying while serving as an intern at NATO’s military headquarters. She had been working at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium — the alliance’s top military command and the nerve Centre of Allied Command Operations, responsible for planning and executing missions across the 32‑member transatlantic security alliance.
On August 13, South Korean police detained two former Chinese military servicemen in separate espionage cases. Both were accused of attempting to surveil of South Korean military operations and U.S. forces stationed in the country. According to security sources, suspected Chinese espionage activities targeting South Korea’s military intelligence and U.S. Forces Korea have sharply increased in recent years.
Over the past two years, Chinese espionage across the European Union and neighbouring states has revealed the scale of Beijing’s infiltration strategy. Investigations uncovered 30 agents and collaborators, exposing a pattern of large‑scale, coordinated operations designed to penetrate Western institutions.
Taken together, these incidents underscore how China is aggressively escalating its espionage war — embedding its intelligence footprint across Europe and Asia while challenging Western and regional security structures.
Fresh evidence has pulled back the curtain on Beijing’s global spy operations. The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) has revealed how China’s espionage network has been steadily infiltrating the Western world. In a landmark move, the Five Eyes alliance identified China as the only country conducting espionage “at scale.”
In its fourth threat assessment report, NZSIS described Beijing as “the most active at conducting foreign interference in New Zealand.” Andrew Hampton, the agency’s Director General, warned: “The kinds of malign behaviours and activities we have seen over the past 12 months are proving even more threatening for a country like New Zealand, given its size and location in the South Pacific.”
Cold War Echoes
When examining Chinese espionage, one crucial question often goes unanswered — why has Beijing become so aggressively active in overseas spying? On the surface, China’s operations appear vast and relentless. But the deeper reality is that Beijing is reviving Cold War–era espionage tactics.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union waged a shadow war of spies against the United States. While the rivalry was framed as a geopolitical contest between two superpowers, the true battle was fought between the CIA and the KGB.
Today, that dynamic has re‑emerged. The current U.S.–China rivalry has evolved into a contest between the CIA and China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS), echoing the CIA–KGB struggle of the Cold War. Intelligence historian Calder Walton underscores the scale of this transformation, writing that “China and its spies are like the Soviet Union on steroids” and “make Soviet efforts during the Cold War look low energy.”
Walton, citing an anonymous FBI official, estimates that the MSS employs around 800,000 personnel — compared to roughly 480,000 at the KGB’s peak. He argues that the MSS now operates worldwide at a scale and tempo not seen in decades, positioning China as the most formidable espionage power of the modern era.
China has essentially enriched itself as a modern spy state, learning through ties with Russia, as detailed in Chinese Communist Espionage: An Intelligence Primer by Peter Mattis and Matthew Brazil.
China’s Intelligence Architecture
China’s intelligence system is vast and multi‑layered. At the centre is the Ministry of State Security (MSS), known as Guoanbu, which serves as the country’s premier intelligence agency and is largely responsible for operations outside China. Domestic intelligence and surveillance fall under the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). Beyond these, the Chinese defence establishment runs its own intelligence arms with global reach.
Agencies such as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Intelligence Bureau of the Joint Staff Department (formerly 2PLA), the PLA’s Cyberspace Force and Information Support Force (formerly 3PLA), and the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission (previously the General Political Department Liaison Office, or GPDLO) all conduct overseas intelligence, HUMINT, and influence operations — often under diplomatic, journalistic, or commercial cover.
As a party‑state, China’s “spy eye” is embedded across all institutions. Spying is not only tolerated but encouraged within Chinese society. Under MSS doctrine, “Counter‑espionage requires the mobilization of the whole society” — effectively turning every citizen into a potential intelligence asset.
The case of Xinhua News Agency illustrates how institutions are woven into this machinery. Regarded as “the eyes, ears, and voice of China,” Xinhua operates more than 20 newspapers and a dozen magazines, publishing in eight languages. With 107 bureaus worldwide and employing over 10,000 staff, Xinhua exemplifies how China’s media apparatus doubles as an intelligence instrument.
According to an investigative report published in April 2021 by the Greek outlet Pentapostagma, Xinhua is described as “one of the important arms of the Chinese intelligence agency in gathering information. Its prime objective is to promote positive narratives about CCP leadership and the Chinese government, while marginalising, demonising, or entirely suppressing anti‑CCP voices.”
Emily Weinstein of the Project 2049 Institute reinforces this view, writing: “Through China’s vast media censorship and Party control, Xinhua has the ability to undermine U.S. soft power and foreign policy messaging by portraying China’s troubling actions as justified, thereby inaccurately influencing international and domestic audiences.”
Vulnerability of Small States
The democratic world is now paying the price of China’s expanding espionage wave. Smaller nations, in particular, remain highly vulnerable to Beijing’s intelligence presence. Masoud Andarabi, the former Minister of Interior of Afghanistan and Acting Director of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), has underscored how China quietly but assertively embeds its influence in developing countries. He notes that China’s intelligence services have mastered the art of “quiet influence.” What begins as economic cooperation gradually evolves into a deep‑rooted intelligence presence — often without the host nation fully realising the shift.
Sri Lanka offers another telling example. A small island nation strategically located near India, it became a target of Chinese influence during the final phase of its civil war. When India and the United States refused to provide lethal arms support, China stepped in with weapons. Later, Beijing cultivated space for large‑scale infrastructure projects, embedding itself firmly in Sri Lanka’s post‑war landscape.
In the broader picture of Chinese espionage operations, which are intensifying worldwide, Professor Patrick Mendis warns: “China’s multibillion‑dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) across the Indo‑Pacific region, which connects the Hambantota Port, the Colombo Port City (CPC), the Colombo Lotus Tower, and many other overwhelming infrastructure projects. These ports could easily be converted into dual‑purpose military and civilian use compounds, making Sri Lanka a potential ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ for China.”
Post‑war Sri Lanka thus stands as a “poster child” of how small countries are vulnerable when doing business with China — where economic partnerships can mask deeper intelligence entrenchment.
Espionage as the New Normal
Against this backdrop, China’s large‑scale espionage operation — known as the “Thousand Grains of Sand” strategy — has become a normalised presence in countries where Beijing is already economically entrenched. This approach relies on gathering countless fragments of information from ordinary citizens, businesses, and institutions, weaving them into a vast intelligence network.
The evidence increasingly shows that the Dragon of espionage has begun its war — not through open confrontation, but through quiet infiltration and relentless intelligence gathering.
China’s espionage war represents more than covert operations; it is a strategic campaign that challenges democratic resilience, sovereignty, and the rules‑based order. For smaller nations, the dilemma is stark: economic partnership with Beijing promises development, but it also risks entanglement in a web of intelligence and influence. The Dragon in the shadows is no longer hidden — it is reshaping the global security landscape in ways the democratic world can no longer afford to ignore.
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A. Jathindra
A. Jathindra is the Head of the Trinco Centre for Strategic Studies (TCSS), a Sri Lanka–based think tank, and an independent geopolitical analyst focusing on South Asian politics and the U.S.–China rivalry on the global stage. His work has appeared in South Asia Monitor and Eurasia Review.
