Sanctions on paper are not sanctions in practice. Technology equipment continues to flow into China and Russia through third-party countries and companies, exposing the gap between Western rhetoric and enforcement. The United States, far from closing these loopholes, appears to be leveraging them selectively to secure commercial advantage.
Sanctions are meant to choke off access to sensitive technologies that can fuel military aggression or authoritarian surveillance. Yet Russia’s war machine and China’s defense industry remain well supplied. In 2023, Russia imported over $5.2 billion worth of dual-use goods from China, including components for drones, electronic warfare systems, and long-range armaments. These are not isolated incidents—they reveal a systemic pattern of sanctions evasion.
The mechanics are straightforward: Third-party intermediaries in countries not directly bound by U.S. or EU sanctions act as conduits. Goods are exported legally to these states, then quietly re-exported to Russia or China. Corporate shell games allow companies to obscure ownership and supply chains. A Chinese firm with a California distributor can funnel restricted components abroad while maintaining a veneer of legitimacy. Weak enforcement means customs agencies and regulators rarely track the end-use of exported goods once they leave Western ports.
The uncomfortable truth is that Washington has little incentive to close these loopholes. Sanctions enforcement is uneven, often harsher on non-U.S. firms in strategic sectors than on American companies themselves. This selective application creates leverage: competitors in Europe or Asia face penalties, while U.S. firms gain market share. In effect, sanctions become a geopolitical tool not only against adversaries but also against allies.
China’s role is particularly telling. Despite announcing restrictions on dual-use exports to Russia in 2024. Beijing continues to supply critical components. The U.S. response has been muted, reflecting a calculation that confronting China directly could disrupt global supply chains. Instead, Washington tolerates the flow of goods while using sanctions pressure to discipline smaller states and companies outside its orbit.
This approach undermines both credibility and security. Allies see sanctions as a mechanism for U.S. commercial advantage rather than collective defense. Adversaries learn that persistence and creative routing can outlast Western resolve. Meanwhile, Ukrainian civilians face the consequences of bombs guided by electronics that should have been blocked years ago.
Sanctions without enforcement are theater. By allowing third-party channels to remain open, the United States signals that its priority is not stopping Russia’s war or curbing China’s military rise, but rather managing global competition to its own benefit. If sanctions are to mean anything, they must be applied consistently—even when enforcement cuts against U.S. commercial interests. Otherwise, they will remain what they increasingly appear to be: a tool of selective leverage, not principled restraint.
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Khedroob Thondup
Khedroob Thondup is the son of Gyalo Thondup, elder brother of the Dalai Lama. Educated at St. Stephens College Delhi University and the University of San Francisco. He was a personal assistant to the Dalai Lama and accompanied him on his first trip to the U.S. in 1979. He was sent by the Dalai Lama to Beijing from 1980 till 1993 for dialogue talks where he interacted with Xi Zhongxun and Hu Jintao. He has served as Member of the Tibetan Parliament in Exile for three terms and is the President of the Tibetan Refugee Self Help Centre Darjeeling since 1987. He has edited two books, Dalai Lama My Son and Tibet in Turmoil and presently lives in Taipei, Taiwan.
