External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar’s official visit to the United Arab Emirates, 14–16 October 2026
Abu Dhabi has become one of the few capitals where the arguments of the twenty-first century are conducted in person. Its sovereign funds underwrite infrastructure on four continents, its ports and airlines stitch the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean, and its diplomats now host conversations that once belonged to London, Washington or Geneva. When External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar arrived there on 14 October 2026, received by Minister of State for International Cooperation Reem Al Hashimy, he entered a city that has learnt to convert geography into influence, and he came as the envoy of a country now practising the same art at continental scale.
The three days that followed carried a density of purpose that the itinerary only partly conveys. A bilateral review with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, a shared stage at the second Raisina Middle East forum, a panel on continental connectivity, a meeting with Georgian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Maka Botchorishvili, and an audience with the Ruler of Ras Al Khaimah each belonged to a single design. India treats the Gulf as an anchor of resilience and, simultaneously, as a platform from which its diplomacy reaches outward towards Europe, the Mediterranean and the Caucasus.
This article advances three linked propositions. First, the India–UAE relationship has matured into a structure of strategic interdependence whose value lies increasingly in its reliability under stress, a quality tested severely by the West Asian war of 2026. Second, the Raisina Middle East discussions articulated a coherent case for reforming international institutions while building trusted, problem-specific partnerships beside them. Third, the meeting with Georgia, read alongside the presence of roughly twenty-five thousand Indian medical students in that country, reveals a frontier of Indian diplomacy where connectivity, education and the protection of citizens abroad converge. Abu Dhabi, in this reading, functions as a hinge between two seas: the Arabian Sea that sustains India’s prosperity and the Black Sea that opens a new horizon of engagement.
Monsoon Memory, Strategic Compact: The Long Arc of India–UAE Relations
The partnership rests on foundations far older than the federation itself. For centuries the monsoon carried dhows between the Malabar and Konkan coasts and the pearling towns of the lower Gulf, and the Indian rupee circulated as a currency along the Trucial Coast until the 1960s. Merchants from Sindh, Gujarat and Kerala settled in its harbours, and the Gulf entered Indian economic life through pearls, dates, timber, textiles and spices long before oil reshaped the region. This inherited familiarity gives the modern relationship a cultural ease that newer partnerships rarely possess.
The second foundation is human. More than nine million Indians live and work in the Gulf, as Dr. Jaishankar reminded the inaugural Raisina Middle East in January 2025, and the UAE hosts the largest community among them. Their labour raised the skylines of Dubai and Abu Dhabi, their remittances sustain households from Thiruvananthapuram to Gorakhpur, and their professional presence now spans finance, medicine, technology and entrepreneurship. Few bilateral relationships possess so intimate a social substrate.
The political transformation has been recent and swift. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the UAE in August 2015, the first by an Indian Prime Minister in thirty-four years, opened a decade of sustained leadership engagement. The relationship rose to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2017. The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, signed in February 2022 and in force from May that year, made the UAE the first Gulf state with which India concluded a comprehensive trade pact. President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan’s visit to New Delhi in January 2026 produced a three-billion-dollar arrangement for Indian purchases of Emirati LNG and a letter of intent towards a strategic defence partnership. Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Abu Dhabi on 15 May 2026 translated that intent into a framework agreement.
The institutional architecture has kept pace with this political momentum. Dr. Jaishankar and Sheikh Abdullah co-chaired the sixteenth session of the Joint Commission and the fifth Strategic Dialogue in Abu Dhabi in December 2025, after which the Minister travelled on to Israel. In September 2026 the two ministers, joined by French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot, reviewed trilateral cooperation on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. The October visit therefore arrived within a dense rhythm of encounters. Its distinctive contribution lies in its timing: it was the first ministerial review in the Gulf since the summer’s agreements on energy and defence, and it took place while the region was still absorbing the consequences of war.
Strategic Reassurance in Abu Dhabi: Continuity as Statecraft
The bilateral meeting on 14 October was a review, and its significance resides in what it confirmed. According to the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the two ministers discussed strengthening cooperation under the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and the Comprehensive Economic Partnership, reviewed progress across the economy, trade and investment, and exchanged views on the evolving regional situation. Sheikh Abdullah reaffirmed the deep-rooted ties between the two countries and their shared commitment to seizing available opportunities for development and prosperity. Dr. Jaishankar described the encounter as warm and productive, conducted in the spirit of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
Such language rewards careful reading. In a year when ceasefires lapsed, shipping lanes closed and reopened, and long-standing alignments across the region came under strain, the reaffirmation of an existing framework constitutes a strategic act in its own right. Partnerships acquire their deepest value when each side can predict the other’s conduct under pressure. Between January and October 2026, India and the UAE converted intentions into instruments: an LNG contract, a strategic petroleum reserve collaboration, an LPG supply agreement, a defence framework and a substantial sovereign investment in Indian infrastructure. The October review belongs to the stewardship phase of that cycle, the moment at which ministers verify that commitments are moving from paper towards implementation.
Convergence between the two countries is real and carefully bounded. Both prize strategic autonomy and practise it with conviction. The UAE maintains deep security ties with the United States, expansive commerce with China, working channels to Russia, normalised relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords, and a complex relationship with Iran across the narrow waters of the Gulf. India balances its partnership with Washington, its long association with Moscow, its engagement with Tehran through the Chabahar port, and its relations across the Arab world. Each capital therefore reads the other’s diplomatic grammar intuitively. Their alignment rests on overlapping interests in stable energy markets, open sea lanes, investment-led growth and the containment of extremism, and it gains strength precisely because each respects the other’s wider relationships.
The meeting with Sheikh Saud bin Saqr Al Qasimi, Ruler of Ras Al Khaimah and member of the UAE Supreme Council, on 16 October extended this logic into the federal fabric of the Emirates. The seven emirates possess distinct economic personalities, and Ras Al Khaimah, with its industrial zones and manufacturing ambitions, offers Indian enterprise an entry point different from Abu Dhabi’s capital markets or Dubai’s trading houses. Dr. Jaishankar noted that the conversation addressed the strengthening of India–UAE ties, deeper engagement with the region and the situation in the Gulf. Engagement with individual emirates reflects a mature understanding of how the federation works and how a partnership thickens from within.
Raisina in the Gulf: Reformed Multilateralism and the Architecture of Order
The second Raisina Middle East, convened on 14–15 October by the Observer Research Foundation in partnership with the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and India’s Ministry of External Affairs, embodies an intellectual partnership as much as a diplomatic one. Originally announced for late January, the forum gathered in October around three organising ideas, Invest, Connect and Secure, and four thematic pillars: networked deterrence and collective security; hubs and groupings for a new world order; corridors of consensus in a fragmenting order; and technological innovation alongside energy security. The existence of a Raisina edition in Abu Dhabi signals a shift of real consequence. A conversation that began in New Delhi in 2016 as India’s flagship geopolitical conference now travels, and the Gulf has become one of its natural homes.
Dr. Jaishankar and Sheikh Abdullah shared the stage at the session titled “The World Ahead: Power, Purpose & Possibility”. His central message was direct: “The reform of multilateralism is urgent.” He added that new partnerships and fresh options are inevitably explored in pursuit of that reform. The formulation contains a complete account of contemporary diplomacy in compressed form. It affirms the enduring importance of universal institutions, it registers the frustration that accumulates when those institutions misrepresent the present distribution of population, production and responsibility, and it explains why states increasingly assemble smaller coalitions to solve specific problems.
The distinction between reform and replacement is essential. Indian diplomacy has consistently argued for a reformed United Nations Security Council, for international financial institutions that give developing economies a voice commensurate with their weight, and for rules on technology and trade shaped by wider participation. Plurilateral and minilateral arrangements, from I2U2 to the India–UAE–France trilateral and IMEC itself, complement this agenda by delivering results where consensus among nearly two hundred states moves slowly. Legitimacy flows from the universal; agility flows from the particular. A wise foreign policy draws on both, and the UAE, which has built its own international standing through exactly this combination of multilateral membership and nimble coalition-building, is an instinctive interlocutor for the argument.
On 15 October, in the panel “The Continental Corridors: Who Connects the Heartland?”, Dr. Jaishankar set out four observations. Competition had sharpened, fresh chokepoints had appeared, and states had grown readier to use their advantages as leverage. Globalisation remained irreversible, and therefore demanded more resilient navigation. IMEC was already influencing how the region thinks about connectivity. India, meanwhile, was strengthening its own capabilities while cultivating partners it can trust. Read together, these points describe a world in which interdependence itself has become an instrument of pressure: control over critical minerals, semiconductors, financial messaging, shipping insurance and maritime passages can each be converted into leverage. Dr. Jaishankar had offered the same diagnosis at the Indian Ocean Conference in Mauritius in April, where he identified chokepoints as a great global anxiety and warned that the temptation to weaponise was overshadowing the benefits of globalisation.
The prescription follows from the diagnosis. Resilience requires domestic capability in manufacturing, technology and energy, and it requires partners whose conduct holds steady when markets tighten or conflicts erupt. The UAE fits this description with unusual precision: it sustained energy cooperation through the crisis of 2026, committed capital to Indian infrastructure, and shares India’s interest in corridors that diversify routes. The “Heartland” of the panel’s title recalls an older geopolitical vocabulary in which control of Eurasia’s interior determined world power. The Raisina discussion offered a contemporary answer. In an age of networks, influence belongs to those who connect, and connection depends on trust as much as on territory.
For developing economies the forum carried a further meaning. India’s G20 Presidency in 2023 brought the African Union into the grouping and placed the concerns of the Global South at the centre of the agenda, and its BRICS chairmanship in 2026, publicly supported by the UAE, continues that effort. When India and the UAE convene a global conversation in the Gulf, they demonstrate that agenda-setting has acquired new centres. Two societies that inherited an international order designed elsewhere are now co-authoring the questions that order must answer.
Geoeconomic Statecraft: CEPA, Capital and the Calculus of Value
The economic relationship provides the ballast for everything else. Bilateral merchandise trade reached 101.25 billion dollars in 2025–26, up from 100.03 billion dollars in 2024–25, crossing the hundred-billion-dollar threshold for the second consecutive year, according to figures released by India’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry and widely cited in the Emirates. Before the CEPA entered into force, trade stood at roughly 73 billion dollars, and the two governments now target 200 billion dollars by 2032. These figures measure goods. Services trade, which Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal described as rising steadily, is accounted for separately, as are investment commitments and realised investment flows.
The composition of trade reveals both achievement and unfinished work. Indian exports to the UAE rose about two per cent to 37.36 billion dollars, while imports grew 0.77 per cent to 63.89 billion dollars, leaving a deficit of 26.53 billion dollars. The deficit largely reflects India’s energy imports and its purchases of gold and precious stones, which feed the domestic jewellery and refining industries. Export growth has been strongest in gems and jewellery, engineering goods, electronics and agricultural products. The trajectory confirms that diversification is under way, and it underlines how much depends on raising the value added in Indian exports.
Investment completes the picture. Foreign direct investment from the UAE into India amounted to 4.34 billion dollars in 2024–25 and 2.45 billion dollars in the first nine months of 2025–26, placing the UAE among India’s leading sources of FDI. The May 2026 summit announced investment by the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority of up to AED 3.67 billion, about one billion dollars or 9,440 crore rupees, through India’s National Investment and Infrastructure Fund, an arrangement the Indian side framed as an exploration of deployment in infrastructure projects. The same package recorded Emirates NBD’s planned investment of three billion dollars in RBL Bank and International Holding Company’s one billion dollars in Sammaan Capital, bringing announced Emirati commitments to roughly five billion dollars. The distinction between announced intentions and realised flows deserves care, since the true measure of these pledges will appear in the investment data of the coming years. ADIA, Mubadala, ADQ and DP World have become familiar names in Indian infrastructure, logistics, renewable energy and digital enterprise, and the opening of DP World and First Abu Dhabi Bank operations in GIFT City in early 2026 brought Emirati finance into India’s international financial centre.
Commerce between the two countries increasingly functions as an instrument of strategy. Goyal has described the CEPA as a gateway to Africa, the wider Gulf, the Commonwealth of Independent States and parts of Europe, and a trade agreement that gives Indian manufacturers preferential access to a global re-export hub extends India’s commercial reach far beyond the bilateral market. Initiatives such as Bharat Mart, conceived as a warehousing and display platform for Indian exporters in Dubai, together with rupee–dirham settlement and the linking of payment systems, pursue the same outcome: lower transaction friction, so that Indian firms can treat the UAE as an extension of their home market. Abu Dhabi’s ambition to diversify beyond hydrocarbons aligns naturally with India’s ambition to serve as a manufacturing, technology and services partner for the region.
The challenges deserve candid acknowledgement. Non-tariff barriers, divergent standards in pharmaceuticals and food products, the concentration of trade in a few commodity categories and the uneven pace of project implementation all constrain the agreement’s potential. The deficit, though structurally explicable, invites a sustained effort to expand Indian services exports and value-added manufacturing. The next phase of the CEPA will be judged by its movement from volume to value: food security corridors, cold-chain logistics, healthcare, fintech, green hydrogen and data infrastructure. Contemporary trade agreements of this kind generate economic resilience, strategic confidence and long-term diplomatic influence, and the India–UAE CEPA has already become a reference point for India’s subsequent trade negotiations.
Silicon and Sovereignty: The Technology Frontier of the Partnership
The partnership is moving decisively from hydrocarbons towards the technologies that will define power in this century. Among the outcomes of the May 2026 summit, India’s Centre for Development of Advanced Computing and the Abu Dhabi technology group G42 concluded a framework for an 8-exaflop supercomputing cluster in India under the IndiaAI Mission. Compute capacity on this scale has become a strategic asset in its own right: it underwrites sovereign artificial intelligence models trained on Indian languages and data, advanced scientific research, weather and climate modelling, and the digital public infrastructure through which India delivers identity, payments and welfare to more than a billion people. Hosting such capacity on Indian soil, with Emirati capital and Indian institutional control, reflects a mature understanding of technological sovereignty as partnership exercised on one’s own terms.
Technology cooperation also carries its responsibilities. Data governance, cybersecurity, export controls on advanced chips and the integrity of supply chains for semiconductors and critical minerals will shape how far such projects can travel. The linking of India’s Unified Payments Interface with Emirati payment systems, the growth of Indian technology firms in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, and Dr. Jaishankar’s meeting with young Indian technology founders on the sidelines of Raisina Middle East together suggest a relationship in which talent, capital and compute now circulate alongside oil and gold. The strategic test lies in converting announced frameworks into operating infrastructure with clear safeguards.
Chokepoint Geopolitics: Energy Security and the Freedom of Passage
The year 2026 has tested the energy dimension of the partnership more severely than any period since the founding of the federation. The war that began in late February, after United States and Israeli strikes on Iran, disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly a fifth of the world’s traded oil normally flows. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard declared the strait effectively closed in early March, and reports described Iranian strikes on American facilities in the Gulf, including in Abu Dhabi. India, which imports the overwhelming majority of its crude oil, faced acute pressure on fuel and LPG supplies. Dr. Jaishankar’s direct engagement with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi secured passage for Indian-flagged tankers in March, a demonstration of the value of keeping channels open with every party to a conflict.
Against this backdrop the energy agreements concluded in May acquire their full meaning. The strategic collaboration between Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves Limited and ADNOC envisages a potential expansion of ADNOC’s crude storage in India to as much as 30 million barrels, building on the 2018 arrangement of nearly six million barrels, and explores crude storage at Fujairah, on the UAE’s Gulf of Oman coast beyond the Strait of Hormuz. A separate agreement between Indian Oil Corporation and ADNOC addresses LPG supplies, while the January contract added long-term LNG. These arrangements convert a commercial supply relationship into a layered system of security: diversified sources, pre-positioned reserves and a storage geography that reduces exposure to a single chokepoint. Each of them, it should be noted, operates as a framework whose volumes and facilities will be realised over time.
The maritime dimension extends well beyond Hormuz. The Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb have suffered repeated disruption since late 2023, raising freight and insurance costs and lengthening voyages around the Cape of Good Hope. Every week of disruption feeds into higher landed costs of energy, fertiliser and food, and into inflation that weighs most heavily on the poorest households. The Indian Navy’s sustained deployments in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea, its escort and anti-piracy operations, and the maritime information shared through the Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region give India a credible contribution to the security of these waters, and maritime domain awareness offers a natural field for deeper India–UAE cooperation. Industrial cooperation is deepening as well: the May agreements included arrangements involving Cochin Shipyard and Emirati partners, among them Drydocks World, to establish a ship-repair cluster at Vadinar in Gujarat, together with maritime workforce training. The human stakes became vivid days before the visit. On 10 October a fire broke out aboard the tanker MT GEM No. 2 off the coast of Ras Al Khaimah; the Coast Guard of the UAE National Guard rescued its crew, and the Consulate General of India in Dubai confirmed that all twenty-two Indian seafarers were safe, working closely with Emirati authorities. Strategic partnerships prove their worth in precisely such moments, when institutions on both sides act swiftly to protect people.
Defence cooperation provides the institutional frame for this convergence. The Framework for the Strategic Defence Partnership, exchanged in May between the two defence ministries, envisages defence-industrial collaboration, technology sharing, innovation and regional security cooperation. It builds on a decade of bilateral exercises, naval visits and counter-terrorism collaboration, and it opens possibilities for co-development and co-production that complement India’s drive for indigenous manufacturing. The wider security environment lends it added context. Pakistan concluded a mutual defence accord with Saudi Arabia in 2025, a development that has reshaped strategic conversations across the Gulf, and India’s defence framework with the UAE, agreed in principle in January and formalised in May, gives its own regional presence durable institutional foundations.
The regional situation calls for analytical restraint. A negotiated pause reached in the summer lapsed in August without a public extension, according to reports, and traffic through the strait has remained well below pre-war levels. India’s position has been consistent: opposition to the targeting of civilians, infrastructure and commercial shipping; support for safe and unimpeded navigation; and a call for dialogue and diplomacy. The UAE, a state directly exposed to the conflict, shares a profound interest in de-escalation. Closer coordination between the two, through information exchange, crisis communication and joint diplomacy, can strengthen regional stability even where the outcome lies beyond the control of either.
Corridor Diplomacy: Connectivity and the Geography of Strategic Agency
Trade routes have always shaped the distribution of power. The Silk Roads enriched the oasis cities of Central Asia, the Cape route displaced them, and the Suez Canal reordered the Indian Ocean once more. A country dependent on a single route accepts a form of subordination to whoever controls it; a country with options possesses agency. The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, announced at the G20 Summit in New Delhi in September 2023 by India, the United States, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, France, Germany, Italy and the European Union, belongs to this logic of options.
IMEC comprises an Eastern Corridor linking India’s western ports with the Gulf and a Northern Corridor carrying cargo by rail across the Arabian Peninsula to the Mediterranean and onward to Europe, accompanied by digital cables and, prospectively, clean energy infrastructure. The UAE occupies the hinge of this design, with Jebel Ali and Khalifa ports, Fujairah’s position on the open sea, an expanding national rail network and the financial depth to underwrite infrastructure. India and the UAE concluded an inter-governmental framework agreement on the corridor in 2024, and work on the India–UAE leg has begun with a digital platform to harmonise vessel, voyage and cargo procedures between Mundra, Kandla and Nhava Sheva on one side and Jebel Ali and Fujairah on the other.
A sober assessment separates the corridor’s vision from its present reality. The Northern Corridor depends on rail links across Saudi Arabia and Jordan and on political conditions in the Levant that the Gaza war and the 2026 conflict have rendered deeply uncertain. Analysts point to an outstanding rail gap between Al Ghuwaifat in the UAE and Haradh in Saudi Arabia, and to competition among Gulf states to become the region’s primary logistics hub. Dr. Jaishankar has acknowledged that delays are a matter of concern while noting that all partners have reconfirmed their commitment. His Abu Dhabi observation that IMEC already shapes regional thinking captures a subtle truth: a corridor influences investment decisions, port planning and diplomatic alignment well before its final segment opens.
IMEC belongs to a wider portfolio. The International North–South Transport Corridor, linking Mumbai with Russia through Iran and the Caspian region, offers access to Central Asia and northern Eurasia, and India’s long-term agreement on Chabahar port anchors its Iranian segment. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, widely known as the Middle Corridor, connects China and Central Asia with Europe across the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Türkiye. These routes have different sponsors, institutional structures and purposes, and each serves a distinct function. Their combined significance lies in redundancy: every additional route reduces the leverage that any single chokepoint or gatekeeper can exercise over Indian commerce. The Middle Corridor runs through Georgia, and that geography explains why the Georgian encounter in Abu Dhabi deserves careful attention.
Black Sea Horizon: The Georgian Opening in India’s Eurasian Outreach
Dr. Jaishankar’s meeting with Maka Botchorishvili on 14 October, on the sidelines of Raisina Middle East, marked a quiet and meaningful advance in a relationship that India has been deliberately elevating. He observed that bilateral ties in trade, tourism and education have been expanding, and the two ministers discussed deeper cooperation in business, connectivity, culture and people-to-people contacts, alongside current regional developments. The venue carried its own message. Botchorishvili is a frequent presence in the Gulf, meeting UAE ministers at Abu Dhabi Sustainability Week in January 2026 and speaking at the Arab Media Forum in Dubai in September, and Georgia actively courts Emirati investment. An India–Georgia conversation in Abu Dhabi took place at the intersection of three sets of interests.
The historical connections are older and warmer than commonly realised. Indian folklore, especially the Panchatantra, influenced Georgian folk legend; Shota Rustaveli’s medieval epic, The Knight in the Panther’s Skin, gives one of its heroes an Indian royal identity; and the nineteenth-century painter Niko Pirosmani depicted a hunting scene set in India. Relics of the seventeenth-century Georgian Queen St Ketevan, martyred in Persia, were preserved in Goa’s St Augustine Church, and a portion was handed over to Georgia by Dr. Jaishankar during his visit to Tbilisi in July 2021, a gesture that resonated deeply in Georgian society. India recognised Georgia’s independence in December 1991 and has consistently upheld its sovereignty and territorial integrity, a position India’s ambassador reaffirmed in Tbilisi in June 2026.
The institutional relationship has gained substance only recently. For decades India’s Embassy in Yerevan was concurrently accredited to Georgia. India operationalised a resident mission in Tbilisi in July 2024, and its first resident Ambassador, Amit Kumar Mishra, assumed charge on 20 March 2026. He has since met the Speaker of Parliament, the Head of the Government Administration, senior ministers and the leadership of medical universities, and Georgian interlocutors have repeatedly described his appointment as a milestone. Parliamentary diplomacy has moved in parallel: Speaker Shalva Papuashvili visited New Delhi in December 2025, and a Georgia friendship group now functions in the Indian Parliament. A resident ambassador transforms episodic contact into continuous presence, bringing consular capacity, commercial intelligence and the ability to protect citizens in real time.
Georgia’s geography explains its strategic appeal. Positioned between the Black Sea and the Caspian basin, and bordered by Russia, Türkiye, Armenia and Azerbaijan, it serves as the principal Caucasian link of the Middle Corridor and hosts the ports of Poti and Batumi alongside the long-planned deep-sea port at Anaklia. Speaker Papuashvili has described India’s potential use of the Middle Corridor as enormous, and Botchorishvili has characterised the corridor as an enterprise in which every major global actor holds an interest. For India, a Black Sea gateway offers a route towards Eastern Europe that complements both IMEC and the INSTC.
Georgia’s foreign policy environment requires careful understanding. Tbilisi formally maintains European Union integration as its primary goal, while its government has suspended accession ambitions until 2028 and its relations with Brussels have cooled considerably. It pursues pragmatic economic ties with Russia despite unresolved territorial disputes over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, engages China on infrastructure, and practises what Botchorishvili calls multivector diplomacy across Central Asia, the Gulf and Asia. India, which itself values a diversified foreign policy, approaches Georgia free of ideological preconditions, respecting its sovereign choices while building practical cooperation. This posture gives India a distinctive standing in a region where larger powers often arrive with competing demands.
Realism should temper enthusiasm. Bilateral trade remains modest, centred on Indian exports of vehicles and parts, pharmaceuticals and machinery; Indian investment, led by firms such as Tata Power and by individual agricultural investors, remains limited in scale; and the idea of a free trade agreement has yet to mature into a concluded pact. Direct air connectivity, which IndiGo established with daily Delhi–Tbilisi flights in August 2024, is currently suspended. Tourism is the brighter story, with around 140,000 Indian visitors to Georgia in the most recent year recorded by the Ministry of External Affairs. The opportunities lie in pharmaceuticals, information technology, healthcare, tourism, film production and agriculture, sectors the new ambassador has highlighted. Georgia’s strategic significance to India currently exceeds the scale of their commerce, and the relationship will grow through connectivity, institutional engagement and, above all, the care of the Indian students who constitute its largest human bridge. Geography alone, however, establishes potential; a commercially viable India–UAE–Georgia route would require competitive transit costs, compatible customs regimes, reliable Caspian and Black Sea shipping and sustained political stability across the South Caucasus.
Scalpels, Statutes and Sovereignty: The Georgian Medical Degree Dilemma
The most consequential human dimension of India–Georgia relations lives in the lecture halls and teaching hospitals of Tbilisi, Batumi and Kutaisi. Indian students form the largest group of foreign students in Georgia by a wide margin. According to Georgia’s National Statistics Office, Indian citizens accounted for 20,319 of the 37,125 foreign students enrolled in the 2024–25 academic year, a twelvefold increase since 2019, and about ninety-one per cent of all foreign students in Georgia study medicine. Data placed before India’s Parliament record annual departures of Indian students to Georgia rising from 4,148 in 2019 to 10,470 in 2023. The Georgian Embassy in New Delhi stated in May 2025 that more than 21,000 Indian students were studying in Georgia, and the Ministry of External Affairs’ bilateral brief of July 2026 places the figure at about 25,000 Indian students of medicine.
These figures differ because they measure different things at different moments: annual departures, total enrolment in a given academic year, and current estimates. All sources concur on the essential point. Georgia has become one of the principal destinations for Indian medical education abroad. Foreign students now make up about a fifth of all higher-education students in Georgia, and at Tbilisi State Medical University they account for roughly forty-five per cent of enrolment. A single private institution, Tbilisi Medical Academy, reported 397 Indian students on its rolls in 2026 and 436 Indian graduates already pursuing careers in several countries.
The reasons are well understood. India’s medical colleges have expanded their seats remarkably over the past decade, and the demand generated by the more than two million candidates who sit the NEET examination each year still far exceeds the places available. Georgia offers English-medium six-year programmes accredited by its National Center for Educational Quality Enhancement, an agency recognised by the World Federation for Medical Education; annual tuition at many universities ranges from roughly four thousand to seven and a half thousand dollars; and the country is accessible and widely regarded as safe. The war in Ukraine, which displaced thousands of Indian medical students in 2022, redirected a significant part of this flow towards Georgia.
Behind these numbers lies a regulatory question of profound consequence for thousands of families. India’s National Medical Commission governs the recognition of foreign medical qualifications through the Foreign Medical Graduate Licentiate Regulations, 2021, which apply to students who began their foreign medical education after the regulations were notified on 18 November 2021; earlier cohorts remain governed by the previous screening framework, a distinction that matters greatly for students now in their final years. The 2021 regulations require a course of at least fifty-four months, an internship of at least twelve months at the same foreign institution and instruction in English. Regulation 4(b) adds the decisive condition: the graduate must hold a licence to practise medicine in the country where the degree was obtained, at par with the licence granted to that country’s own citizens. Graduates then sit the Foreign Medical Graduate Examination, which remains the operative gateway while the proposed National Exit Test awaits implementation, and complete a compulsory rotating internship in India.
Two official readings now confront each other. Georgia’s Ministry of Education, Science and Youth, in information circulated through the Georgian Embassy in New Delhi, sets out the Georgian position plainly. Under the Law of Georgia on Medical Practice, every graduate of an accredited MD programme acquires the right to be employed as a junior doctor, and acquires it directly upon graduation, with the degree itself serving as the qualification. Article 14 of the same law authorises the junior doctor to perform the duties of a doctor: clinical work under the guidance of a certified specialist, and independent emergency care whenever a certified doctor is unavailable. On this basis the Ministry concludes that the junior doctor status corresponds fully to the MBBS qualification in India and that Georgian medical education complies with the NMC’s rules.
The NMC, in a clarification issued on 24 September 2026 in reply to a public grievance and reported widely in early October, reads the same facts differently. It holds that Regulation 4(b) requires a licence to practise at par with Georgian citizens, to be judged against Georgian law, and that supervised junior-doctor status, on its reading, falls short of a full licence to practise. Independent practice in Georgia follows postgraduate residency and the Unified State Certification Examination, and the Indian Embassy noted in June 2024 that it also involves competence in the Georgian language. The complainant behind the grievance further alleged that some education consultants misrepresent these rules to prospective students.
Read carefully, the two positions disagree about a single word. Georgia’s argument is fundamentally an argument of parity: a Georgian citizen who completes the MD programme receives exactly the junior-doctor right that an Indian graduate receives, and both proceed to full independent practice only after residency. In that sense the Indian graduate already holds what Georgian citizens hold at the same stage, which is precisely the comparison Regulation 4(b) invites. The NMC’s reading equates a licence with independent practice, the status an Indian MBBS graduate attains after internship and registration at home. The two medical systems place the milestone of independent licensure at different points in a doctor’s career: India confers it at graduation, Georgia confers it after specialisation. The dispute therefore concerns the mapping of one national architecture onto another, and such questions of equivalence are exactly what governments resolve through structured dialogue. A matter of definition has become a matter of livelihood.
As of mid-October 2026, no bilateral resolution has been announced. The ministers’ meeting in Abu Dhabi acknowledged education among the expanding dimensions of the relationship, and the official accounts carry no reference to the licensing question, which therefore stands as an urgent item for the next stage of engagement. Meanwhile anxiety is spreading through Indian households. Students midway through six-year programmes ask whether the degree they are earning will open the door to the examination that leads home. Recent graduates ask whether the junior-doctor certificate in their hands satisfies the regulation that governs their future. Parents who have mortgaged land and borrowed against pensions ask who will give them an authoritative answer. Prospective applicants and their families ask whether Georgia, which has become one of the most trusted destinations for Indian medical aspirants, remains a safe choice. Georgian universities, for whom Indian students form a vital constituency, ask how they can demonstrate compliance to a regulator whose interpretation has hardened. The question spans educational policy, consular responsibility and bilateral trust at once.
Georgia’s own policy environment adds urgency. Its government has decided, as part of a higher-education reform that prioritises Georgian citizens, that state universities will stop admitting new foreign students, while private universities continue to enrol them, and reports indicate that new requirements on language-proficiency documentation and minimum annual academic progress followed in June 2026. Future Indian enrolment will therefore concentrate in private institutions, where quality assurance, the genuineness of clinical exposure and internship arrangements within the same institution merit close and institution-specific verification. International accreditation of a Georgian university establishes the quality of its programme; eligibility to practise in India rests on the separate test of Indian regulation, and families deserve to understand both.
An Agenda for Diplomatic Action: Towards an India–Georgia Recognition Compact
The situation calls for the direct attention of the External Affairs Minister and the Ministry of External Affairs, working with the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and the National Medical Commission, and engaging Georgia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its Ministry of Education, Science and Youth and its medical universities. The newly established resident embassy in Tbilisi and the strong personal rapport evident in Abu Dhabi provide exactly the channels such a negotiation requires. The goal should be a clear, published and binding understanding, reached at the earliest opportunity, of how Georgian medical qualifications and professional rights correspond to Indian requirements.
Such a recognition compact could rest on five elements. First, a joint technical committee of the NMC and Georgian authorities to map Georgian licensing categories onto Regulation 4(b), producing an authoritative joint clarification that ends the present ambiguity. Second, a defined pathway through which Indian graduates who satisfy the course, internship and language requirements can obtain the Georgian licence or certification the NMC accepts, with any transitional relief extended to cohorts admitted in good faith under earlier understandings. Third, an institution-wise verification register of Georgian universities whose clinical training and internship arrangements meet Indian standards, published and updated jointly. Fourth, a dedicated grievance-redressal and welfare mechanism at the Embassy in Tbilisi, supported by a voluntary registry of Indian students, drawing on the experience of evacuations from Ukraine and Sudan. Fifth, statutory registration and accountability for overseas education consultants in India, so that misleading recruitment meets consequences at the point of decision.
The strategic dividend of such a settlement would be considerable. A predictable framework protects twenty-five thousand Indian students and their families, preserves Georgia’s standing as a destination for Indian medical education, gives Georgian universities a stable and transparent relationship with Indian regulation, and strengthens a bilateral relationship that has only just acquired a resident ambassador. It would also demonstrate a principle with value far beyond the Caucasus: India’s global footprint is increasingly carried by its people, whether workers in the Gulf, technologists in North America, nurses in Europe or medical students in Tbilisi, and the protection, guidance and professional recognition of these citizens have become core functions of foreign policy. When Dr. Jaishankar named education among the expanding dimensions of India–Georgia ties, he identified the strand of the relationship that touches the largest number of Indian households. Resolving it would turn a source of anxiety into a showcase of people-centred diplomacy.
Trilateral Imagination: Gulf Capital, Indian Capability, Caucasian Corridors
The Abu Dhabi setting invites a further thought, offered here as a prospect, since no trilateral arrangement among India, the UAE and Georgia currently exists. The UAE has invested in Georgia and maintains active high-level contact with Tbilisi, including a visit by President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed; India brings markets, pharmaceutical manufacturing, digital public infrastructure and a large student and tourist presence; Georgia offers a Black Sea gateway and a position on the Middle Corridor. Logistics linking Indian ports through Emirati hubs to Georgian terminals, Indian generic medicines distributed through Emirati trade networks into the Caucasus, partnerships in healthcare and medical education, and interoperable digital payments all mark areas where the interests of the three could meet. Such ideas would require commercial validation and political will on every side. Their value lies in showing how India’s partnerships can reinforce one another, so that a relationship anchored in the Gulf becomes a bridge to relationships beyond it.
Conclusion
The October visit admits of a modest reading and an ambitious one, and both are accurate. Modestly, it was a well-executed sequence of engagements that reviewed an established partnership, enriched a successful forum and advanced a secondary bilateral relationship. Ambitiously, it displayed the architecture of a foreign policy that treats resilience as its organising principle: anchor relationships that hold under stress, a portfolio of corridors that reduces dependence on any single route, institutions reformed to reflect the present world, and a diplomatic reach that follows Indian citizens and Indian commerce wherever they go.
The UAE serves as the anchor in this design. Its reliability through the energy shocks of 2026, its capital and its geography make it one of India’s most consequential partners anywhere. Georgia represents the compass needle swinging outward, towards a region where India’s presence is new and its potential considerable. Between anchor and compass lies the patient work of diplomacy: implementing agreements announced in January and May, converting frameworks for supercomputing, ship repair and strategic reserves into operating assets, securing maritime commerce, financing corridors and persuading partners that India’s rise brings opportunity to all who engage with it.
One task carries a particular moral urgency. Some twenty-five thousand young Indians are training to become doctors in Georgia, and their families now wait, many in genuine distress, for clarity on whether those degrees will lead them home to practise. Two governments hold two readings of a single regulation; the students stand between them. The resolution lies within reach of diplomacy, and the moment to pursue it is now. A swift, transparent understanding between New Delhi and Tbilisi, led by the Ministry of External Affairs with the National Medical Commission and Georgia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and medical universities, would settle the question of recognition, restore confidence in Georgia as a destination for medical education and prove that India’s widening diplomatic compass points, always, towards the welfare of its citizens.
Dr. Jaishankar’s closing point at the corridors panel, that India is strengthening its own capabilities while cultivating partners it can trust, offers the fitting summation. In Abu Dhabi in October 2026 the two halves of that idea were visible: the confidence of a country prepared to argue for reformed institutions and diversified routes, and the trust accumulated with a Gulf partner over centuries of exchange and a decade of strategic deepening. The road from the Arabian Sea to the Black Sea runs, for now, through Abu Dhabi, and Indian diplomacy has begun to travel it with purpose.
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Dr. Maheep
Dr. Maheep is Director, Indian Perspective on Global Affairs (IPGA), and a leading analyst of India’s foreign policy and South Asian geopolitics. He earned his PhD in Arab and Islamic Studies. With more than a decade of teaching and research experience in International Relations and Global Politics, he contributes regularly on issues shaping national and global affairs.















