Southeast Asia’s only tool for maintaining stability and conflict management is ASEAN. As all conflict management models are imperfect and expose their weaknesses during prolonged conflicts, ASEAN, too, could benefit from some changes.
ASEAN’s conflict prevention model or conflict management within ASEAN is based on the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) signed by all member states of ASEAN. The main principles to peaceful settlement of conflicts and management of disputes are spelt out in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which is the core of ASEAN’s conflict management model or framework. In addition to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, there is also the normative structure of the ASEAN Way or conflict prevention model. This conflict prevention model is based on two main elements, that is informal and gradual. It is relationship-based and mainly based on diplomacy. The major objective of ASEAN’s conflict prevention model is to prevent any form of confrontation between any of the member states of ASEAN and to create a conducive dialogue environment and mutual understanding. The conflict prevention model of ASEAN does not include any binding decisions or any form of coercive penalties. This region of Southeast Asia, in the past, was divided by suspicion and rivalry between countries. The normative structure based on the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation thus tries to prevent conflicts and manage them should they occur in the region.
In addition to the conflict-resolution model that has already been described above, ASEAN has a number of other mechanisms that are operational within the organisation and/or between ASEAN and other external parties. Annual Summits of ASEAN leaders and Foreign Ministers’ Meetings are held every year and provide the necessary opportunity for dialogue between individual member-states and between all the member-states as a group, in order to resolve any outstanding issues that may have arisen and in order to prevent these pending issues from escalating into full-blown crises. The Chairperson of ASEAN provides yet another forum, where dialogues are held with individual member-states and between all member-states, on an ongoing basis, within and outside of meetings, in order to resolve any pending issues between individual member-states and/or between all member-states as a group. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) have also institutionalised practices of cooperation and dialogue between ASEAN and its external parties, on the one hand, and between each of these external parties and the other, on the other hand. The annual meetings between the defence ministers of ASEAN and its eight dialogue partners, India, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Russia (the ADMM-Plus), are also operational. Practices of cooperation and dialogue have been contained within these mechanisms and have been used by member-states to manage their differences in order to ensure that these differences do not cause any harm to the region’s stability.
ASEAN has both strengths and weaknesses as a conflict-resolving model. One of the serious weaknesses is that ASEAN has no mechanism of enforcement, whether individually or collectively. In other words, ASEAN cannot force any of its member states to comply with any decisions made by ASEAN or to settle any disputes within ASEAN. Although the High Council, as provided in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, has the wide potential to settle any disputes between any two or more countries through peaceful means, it has not been invoked for any disputes between any ASEAN member states. Another serious weakness is that the emphasis on consensus among all member states in making any decisions hampers ASEAN in effectively and promptly responding to any regional issues and crises, and in implementing any decisions that have already been made by ASEAN. In other words, the implementation of any decisions made by ASEAN can be far from perfect and is subject to individual countries’ implementation.
To initiate reforms of ASEAN, several challenges have to be addressed. On the one hand, ASEAN must find a way to manage and contain the internal instability of a member state while at the same time attempting to ward off major power influences on the region. This was exemplified by ASEAN’s failure to implement its Five-Point Consensus for a peaceful return to normalcy in Myanmar following the military coup in February 2021. On the other hand, ASEAN member states need to address their disputes in order to contain them within the framework of ASEAN. In the South China Sea, the combined interests of the member states differ greatly and are further put under pressure by external powers. While all members agree on the necessity of handling the issues of the region within the framework of ASEAN, it has proven to be difficult for the organisation to adopt a collective position. Once a decision has been made within ASEAN, the implementation on the part of the member states has often been lacking. The border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear temple area, for example, was managed by ASEAN within the framework of diplomacy and regional engagement in order to prevent an escalation of the conflict. However, the underlying grievances of both countries that led to the conflict could not be solved through mediation.
This can also be the case where ASEAN’s decision-making process can be easily swayed by external influences such as major powers vying for influence within the Southeast Asian region. Each of the member states is courted by external powers, and thus, it would be more challenging for ASEAN to sustain its centrality amidst the diverse interests of member states and increasing competition for influence by major powers in the region. Thus, ASEAN is not irrelevant as it can still help in managing and containing differences, but it is more of a forum than a mediator or change agent in crises.
In summary, to continue to preserve stability and prevent full-scale conflict in the region, future reforms of ASEAN must, in the end, continue to preserve the core of ASEAN’s conflict-resolution model. This can be done by permitting more flexible forms of consensus amongst the Member States of ASEAN. In this way, those who wish to cooperate and progress with each other can do so without hindrance from the rest. A more effective and independent ASEAN Secretariat is imperative. The Secretariat must be equipped with the best available analysis, data, and a professional and efficient support staff to assist the Member States in their work in ASEAN. The Chair of ASEAN must continue to facilitate dialogue amongst the Member States and with key Regional and Global players. The Chair of ASEAN must also be empowered with a stronger crisis-management role. The earlier the ASEAN Member States intervene in potential conflicts by means of early-warning systems and the practice of preventive diplomacy, the better it would be for all concerned.
While ASEAN’s conflict resolution model contains elements which can be considered to be meritorious in preserving stability through dialogue and respect for other parties’ sovereignty, its implementation may have to be adapted to the evolving security environment in Southeast Asia. Ultimately, ASEAN’s conflict-resolver model is only as good as the political will of its member-states to change or to reinforce the existing frameworks within ASEAN without watering down the essence of ASEAN. A region plagued by power rivalry and a low level of inter-state trust requires nothing more than refining the existing frameworks within ASEAN, rather than constructing another elaborate structure from scratch.
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Simon Hutagalung
Simon Hutagalung is a retired Indonesian Foreign Ministry diplomat and received his Master’s degree in Political Science and Comparative Politics from the City University of New York. He writes opinion pieces for Europeantimes and all opinions expressed in his article are his own.
