OP-ED: The European Union struggles to achieve true strategic independence when handling the Ukraine crisis because its security system and diplomatic power depend heavily on American backing and Western-imposed economic penalties. Chancellor Friedrich Merz proposed the “Shanghai format” as a possible dialogue channel, which showed Europe’s understanding of a multipolar world where non-Western coalitions like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) establish new negotiation systems that avoid EU and NATO frameworks. Europe needs to establish operational systems for Shanghai format management, which will create protective measures for Ukraine’s sovereignty through international law compliance and sustainable peace development.
The SCO was established in June 2001 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to address shared security challenges—particularly terrorism, separatism, and border stability—following the Afghan civil war. The organisation expanded its membership base during the following twenty years by admitting India and Pakistan as full members in 2017 and granting dialogue partner status to Iran in 2021, which resulted in a ten-state bloc with Belarus and Mongolia as observers. The organisation requires unanimous agreement for decision-making, which gives China and Russia veto power to block any resolution that opposes their strategic goals. The SCO achieves its Shanghai format through its economic cooperation programs, including Silk Road Economic Belt pilot projects and its consensus-based political system, which maintains Western influence at a non-dominant level.
The Shanghai format demonstrates the conflict between liberal institutionalist principles and realist power relations according to theoretical analysis. Liberal institutionalism supports a rule-based system and majority voting and conditionality based on human rights and democratic norms, which form the core of EU diplomatic practices. Realism recognises the differences in state power, but it gives the highest priority to state sovereignty regardless of ethical concerns. The SCO framework bases its approach on realist principles through its focus on non-interference and strategic partnership instead of value-based conditions. Europe needs to find a way to participate in this format without losing its values by making the SCO’s inclusive approach work with Ukraine’s territorial protection and human rights defence.
The SCO model faces direct obstacles when used to address the current situation in Ukraine. The system becomes paralysed when any major actor, particularly China, decides to defend Russia from necessary concessions. EU capitals, together with Kyiv, face major doubts about legitimacy because Russia and Iran’s participation seems to validate their actions in Donbas and Crimea. The SCO functions without mechanisms to enforce agreements or monitor compliance, which makes its agreements exist only as non-enforceable statements of purpose. The parliamentary oversight system of Brussels, together with its civil society participation model, frequently clashes with the secretive nature of SCO-style diplomatic operations. The solution to these problems requires institutions that unite open data sharing with privacy protection mechanisms and strict rules with flexible operational methods.
The SCO’s 2019 involvement in Afghanistan demonstrates both positive and negative aspects, according to a detailed assessment. The Astana summit enabled high-level security dialogues that brought Taliban representatives together with Afghan government officials for direct talks, which produced a ceasefire plan that member states supported. The absence of enforceable rules and dependable outside monitoring systems led to the current state of armed conflicts. Economically, over a decade of SCO negotiations regarding a free-trade zone have stalled due to disputes over tariffs and investment protections. The SCO operates as an effective veto coordination system within the United Nations framework, yet it rarely converts its consensus statements into actual conflict resolution measures.
Europe’s internal fragmentation regarding Ukraine policy exacerbates these external challenges. A recent Eurobarometer poll reveals that while 68 per cent of EU citizens support ongoing sanctions until a peace agreement preserves Ukraine’s sovereignty, only 42 per cent endorse direct negotiations with Moscow under Chinese mediation. Germany maintains a slow and measured approach to sanctions, which stands in opposition to Poland’s firm position for complete sanctions against Russia, and Italy and Hungary’s occasional interest in restoring diplomatic ties with Russia. This array of positions diminishes Brussels’ collective bargaining power in any Shanghai format negotiation. The lack of a single European voice enables Moscow to create obstacles for advancement through the exploitation of existing divisions.
The achievement of any negotiation depends on Ukraine taking an active role as a co-architect who influences the process rather than being seen as an uninvolved party. The government of Kyiv has shown its ability to manage wartime governance and humanitarian responses and reconstruction planning during times of extreme crisis. The grassroots networks of Ukraine play an equally crucial role through their volunteer medical brigades and municipal reform groups, and diaspora organisations that advocate internationally. The Shanghai format will gain transparency, and local human-security needs and cultural restoration priorities will be protected through formal observer status for civil society actors in preparatory committees.
A full operational system has been established to turn the theoretical diplomatic potential of the Shanghai format into an operational diplomatic channel. The first requirement for negotiators involves creating a non-rollback clause which confirms Ukraine’s existing international borders while offering step-by-step sanctions relief based on security guarantees that can be proven. Europe should implement specific economic incentives through co-financed infrastructure funds to support SCO member states that endorse a Ukraine peace roadmap. A permanent secretariat based in Geneva would serve as the coordinating body for specialised working groups on ceasefires and humanitarian corridors and prisoner exchanges, and phased reconstruction. The inclusion of independent human rights monitors together with civil society liaisons in these bodies would create both public accountability and legitimacy. The Shanghai format will benefit from digital diplomacy and communication strategies, which will increase transparency while fighting disinformation and building immediate stakeholder trust and ensuring public support for negotiated progress and validating the process and results for Ukrainian citizens.
The system faces various potential risks according to the proposed design structure. China might exploit the format to solidify its Belt and Road interests in Eastern Europe. Russia might conduct fake negotiations through which it would use diplomatic talks to acquire additional time for military deployment. The member states of the SCO face potential misalignment of priorities because Russia works to preserve its influence in Central Asia while China builds economic connections in the region. The diplomatic standing of Europe faces danger because it needs to find the right balance between accommodating the format and maintaining its territorial sovereignty. A balanced method requires both strict boundaries and flexible diplomatic relations.
To conclude, Europe must adopt Chancellor Merz’s advice to achieve success in a multipolar world through strategic realism and normative clarity. Europe needs to develop fresh institutional guidelines for the Shanghai format, which will safeguard Ukraine’s core interests while fostering economic relations between member states and implementing civil society oversight to convert its strategic disadvantage into a new diplomatic opportunity. The dual-track approach enables the EU to uphold its core principles while recognising the diplomatic abilities of non-Western alliances, which creates a practical method to achieve peace in Ukraine.
[The opinions expressed in this article are of the author. Europeantimes.org takes no responsibility for the same.]
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Simon Hutagalung
Simon Hutagalung is a retired Indonesian Foreign Ministry diplomat and received his Master’s degree in Political Science and Comparative Politics from the City University of New York. He writes opinion pieces for Europeantimes and all opinions expressed in his article are his own.
