Pakistan and the Polio It Refuses to End
Asia

Pakistan and the Polio It Refuses to End

On 3 November 2026, gunmen on a motorcycle opened fire on a police vehicle in Mohmand, a district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa abutting the Afghan frontier. Two officers travelling to guard polio vaccination teams were shot dead and a third was wounded. A day earlier, four people attached to the campaign were abducted in the same province, with initial reports placing the kidnapping in Tank district. The bloodshed struck the second day of a sub-national round aimed at nearly 24 million children, launched within hours of the confirmation of Pakistan’s eighth wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) case of the year: a 13-month-old girl from Bara tehsil in Khyber district, now condemned to the flaccid paralysis of a disease the rest of humanity has consigned to history.

These events demand to be read as more than another grim entry in a long ledger. They expose a state that, after three decades and billions of dollars of international assistance, still cannot guarantee safe passage to a vaccinator carrying two drops of oral vaccine. Every child left unimmunised in Bannu, Khyber or Karachi becomes a potential vector for a virus that respects no border. Poliovirus incubating in Pakistan’s reservoirs travels with labourers to the Gulf, with pilgrims to Iran and Iraq, with deportees to Afghanistan, and with traders and families towards India. A single exported case could reignite transmission across the neighbourhood and render futile the sacrifices of a global campaign that has eliminated wild polio from every other country on earth bar Afghanistan.

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative, its partners and millions of frontline workers have driven the disease to the edge of extinction. Pakistan alone, among nations of its size and resources, has repeatedly allowed that edge to recede. Its socio-economic neglect of high-risk districts, its tolerance of entrenched misinformation, its failure to protect those who vaccinate and its inability to win the confidence of its own citizens have kept the virus alive. The persistence of this pernicious disease is, at its root, a Pakistani responsibility, and the same convergence of insecurity, refusal and administrative indifference that sustains it today threatens a resurgence tomorrow, at home and far beyond.

The Anatomy of a Persistent Reservoir

Pakistan’s epidemiological record is a study in squandered opportunity. The country reported 147 cases in 2019 and 84 in 2020. In 2021 it recorded a solitary case, and the world briefly believed interruption was within reach. Islamabad then presided over a collapse in vigilance: cases rose to 20 in 2022, and after a deceptive lull of six in 2023, exploded to 74 in 2024, the highest global tally that year. The 31 cases of 2025 and eight of 2026 are offered by officials as proof of progress. They are better read as evidence of a pattern in which every gain is surrendered before it can be consolidated.

The geography of transmission indicts the state with particular force. Six of this year’s eight cases arose in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, four in its southern districts, with the Bannu division serving as the year’s epicentre; the remaining two arose in Sindh. These are the very districts in which the National Emergency Operations Centre itself concedes that security-related access constraints leave children unvaccinated. A virus that survives only where the writ of the state has dissolved is a precise measure of where that writ has dissolved.

The paralytic cases form only the visible fraction of a far larger burden. Poliovirus produces paralysis in roughly one in two hundred infections; for every crippled child, scores of asymptomatic carriers shed virus in their stool. Environmental surveillance confirms the scale. Sewage from Karachi tested positive throughout 2026 before a six-month-old boy in Karachi East was paralysed in October, the city’s first case in more than eighteen months. The Peshawar block, comprising Peshawar and Khyber districts, continues to yield positive samples. Pakistan’s megacities and its frontier thus form a single, connected reservoir, and silent circulation persists long after official statements proclaim decline.

Certification requires three consecutive years free of wild transmission, attested by sensitive surveillance. Pakistan has yet to complete a single calendar year without a paralytic wild case. That fact alone situates the country’s claims of progress in their proper context.

Violence and the Abdication of the State

The routine slaughter of those who vaccinate its children is the most damning feature of Pakistan’s polio crisis. Pakistani officials themselves acknowledge that more than 200 polio workers and police escorts have been killed since the 1990s. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa alone, 139 attacks on polio teams between 2012 and 2026 killed 54 policemen and 15 workers. The roll of the dead includes women vaccinators shot on their way home, doctors abducted from awareness camps, and the six policemen and a physician killed by a roadside bomb in Bajaur in January 2024. In September 2025, three WHO-affiliated officials were seized in Tank as a campaign began; in April 2026, escorts were murdered and workers abducted in Hangu and Bannu; and now Mohmand and Tank have added their names to the ledger.

The pattern of these attacks is consistent and instructive. Assailants on motorcycles open fire at close range on escort vehicles and flee; remote-controlled devices target police vans; kidnappers intercept teams in the hills and vanish. The perpetrators are rarely apprehended, and prosecutions seldom follow. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and allied factions have turned the vaccinator into the most exposed agent of a state they seek to humiliate, and the state has repeatedly failed to deny them that target.

This violence grows in soil the Pakistani state itself prepared. For decades, Islamabad cultivated militant proxies as instruments of policy across its western and eastern frontiers, nurtured sanctuaries in the tribal belt, and alternated between military operations and appeasing truces with the very groups now murdering its health workers. The collapse of the truce with the TTP in November 2022 unleashed a fresh wave of militancy, and Pakistan ranked first on the Global Terrorism Index 2026, with 1,139 terrorism deaths in 2025, its highest toll in more than a decade. A state that bred the instruments of terror now finds its own public health programme held hostage by them.

The consequences for eradication are direct and measurable. Attacks force the postponement and truncation of campaigns, widening the immunity gap among children who need repeated doses. The deployment of thousands of armed personnel to escort vaccinators, nearly 11,000 in a single 2025 round in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, transforms a humanitarian act into a quasi-military operation and confirms, in the minds of sceptical households, that the campaign belongs to the security apparatus. Fear depletes the workforce, especially the women whose presence is essential for entry into conservative homes. And frightened teams in contested union councils face every incentive to record children as vaccinated without ever reaching them, so that the data on which the programme steers becomes itself unreliable.

Misinformation, Mistrust and a Credibility Deficit

Where bullets close one door, distrust closes another. In the reservoir districts, oral polio vaccine is widely believed to cause infertility, to contain pork derivatives, or to form part of a Western scheme to depopulate Muslim societies. These claims are medically baseless. The vaccine contains live attenuated poliovirus strains that replicate briefly in the intestinal mucosa and induce protective mucosal and humoral immunity; its safety record across billions of doses is among the best documented in medicine. Yet in Pakistan, rumour routinely defeats evidence.

The responsibility for this lies substantially with the Pakistani state and its religious-political establishment. For years, sections of the clergy, local power-brokers and even elected figures amplified or tolerated anti-vaccine sermons and pamphlets, and the state preferred accommodation to confrontation. The April 2019 Peshawar episode laid the fragility bare: fabricated videos of children fainting after vaccination provoked mass hysteria, a mob set fire to a health facility, and refusals surged across the province. A government confident in its own legitimacy would have dismantled such networks long ago; Pakistan’s instead allowed them to metastasise through WhatsApp groups, mosque loudspeakers and social media.

The Abbottabad episode compounded the damage. Before the 2011 raid that killed Osama bin Laden, a sham hepatitis vaccination drive run by a Pakistani physician was used to gather DNA from the al-Qaeda leader’s household. That the world’s most wanted terrorist had lived for years beside Pakistan’s premier military academy is itself an indictment of the state; that the hunt for him then handed militants a documented pretext to murder vaccinators made Pakistan’s children pay for the state’s duplicity. Fifteen years on, the suspicion endures.

The most corrosive form of refusal today is transactional. Communities withhold vaccination to extract roads, electricity, clean water, schools and security that the state has failed to provide. In April 2024 alone, 11,716 children in fifteen union councils of Khyber, Kurram, Lakki Marwat and the Waziristans missed the oral vaccine because elders attached such demands to the campaign. GPEI’s Independent Monitoring Board counted more than 420,000 children unvaccinated during Pakistan’s 2024 campaigns, with over 200 community-level refusals in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These boycotts are a verdict on governance. A vaccinator who arrives every few weeks with a single free product, in districts where the state supplies little else, becomes the visible symbol of a state that cares for its citizens only when foreign donors are watching.

The Missed Child: Administrative Neglect

Eradication is ultimately an arithmetic of missed children, and Pakistan’s arithmetic is persistently wrong. Oral polio vaccine requires multiple doses to confer dependable immunity in populations burdened by diarrhoeal disease, enteric infections and malnutrition, all of which impair intestinal seroconversion. The reservoir districts carry precisely that burden. A child missed in two successive rounds, or one whose gut absorbs the vaccine poorly, remains susceptible even in a union council reporting high coverage on paper.

The state’s own quality audits reveal the gap. In lot quality assurance surveys in southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa between August 2022 and February 2023, only 56 to 80 per cent of union councils met the quality threshold. The programme repeatedly cites restricted access, a shortage of female vaccinators and the difficulty of door-to-door delivery as the reasons thousands of children stay unprotected. Each of these is a failure of administration: of security, of recruitment and of the will to persist.

The neglect is structural. Health was devolved to the provinces under the Eighteenth Amendment, and provincial-federal friction, frequent transfers of district officials and the politicisation of appointments have repeatedly disrupted microplanning and accountability. Routine immunisation in the reservoirs remains feeble, so that millions of children depend entirely on campaign drops. Sanitation infrastructure in Karachi’s informal settlements and the frontier’s towns remains primitive, ensuring efficient faecal-oral transmission. Labour migration along the Bannu-Peshawar-Karachi corridor and the displacement produced by military operations carry the virus between reservoirs, while nomadic and brick-kiln communities rarely appear in microplans at all.

Over two decades, Pakistan has conducted well over a hundred supplementary immunisation activities, each financed largely by international partners. That the virus survives this volume of effort testifies less to its biological tenacity than to the chronic deficiencies of the administration charged with delivering it.

Exporting the Virus: Pakistan as a Regional and Global Hazard

Pakistan’s polio problem is the world’s problem because Pakistan exports it. Genetic sequencing has repeatedly traced outbreaks far from its borders to Pakistani lineages. The 2011 outbreak in Xinjiang, which paralysed children in a country polio-free for over a decade, was linked to virus from Pakistan. Wild poliovirus detected in Syria in 2013, and in sewage in Egypt and Israel the same period, belonged to Pakistani strains. In 2021 and 2022, Malawi and Mozambique, both long free of wild polio, recorded cases of WPV1 genetically linked to a lineage that circulated in Pakistan in 2019. Each export forced costly emergency responses across continents.

The international community has drawn the obvious conclusion. Since 2014, when the WHO declared the international spread of poliovirus a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, Pakistan has been subject to temporary recommendations requiring departing travellers to carry proof of vaccination. India, prudently, requires the same of travellers arriving from Pakistan. Few distinctions so starkly capture a nation’s standing in global health.

Afghanistan shares the reservoir, and its own deterioration under the Taliban, including the 2024 suspension of house-to-house campaigns, has driven its caseload to at least 42 in 2026. Pakistan bears heavy responsibility for that neighbourhood as well. Its long patronage of the Afghan Taliban shaped the very regime now obstructing vaccination. Its border clashes with Kabul since October 2025 have closed crossings for months, and its mass deportation of Afghans, more than 615,000 through Torkham alone by October 2025 and up to 6,000 a day in April 2026, moves children between two broken programmes at the moment their schedules collapse. The synchronised rounds that reached 44.8 million Pakistani and 12.8 million Afghan children in April 2026 show what cooperation can achieve; Islamabad’s belligerence continually endangers it.

The hazard extends to every partner that receives Pakistani labour, pilgrims and travellers. Millions of Pakistanis work in the Gulf states; hundreds of thousands travel each year to shrines in Iran and Iraq. A single silent carrier can reseed transmission in a population whose immunity has waned since its own elimination. For the Gulf, for West Asia and for India, Pakistan’s reservoirs represent a standing threat to hard-won polio-free status.

The Indian Contrast

India offers the decisive rebuttal to every excuse Pakistan advances. As recently as 2009, India recorded 741 polio cases, more than any other country, and many experts judged it the hardest place on earth to eradicate the disease. Its burdens were formidable: a birth cohort of some 27 million a year, dense urban slums, migrant populations in constant motion, and the epidemiological furnace of western Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, where poor sanitation and high diarrhoeal morbidity depressed vaccine efficacy.

India answered with sustained political ownership and administrative discipline. Through the Pulse Polio programme, it mobilised some 2.3 million vaccinators to reach around 170 million children in each national round. It deployed monovalent and bivalent vaccines to raise per-dose efficacy, vaccinated at railway stations, bus stands and construction sites, mapped migrant and nomadic communities, and enlisted religious leaders and community mobilisers from minority neighbourhoods to overcome resistance. The last case of wild polio in India was reported in Howrah, West Bengal, on 13 January 2011. In March 2014, the WHO certified India, together with the South-East Asia Region, as polio-free.

The contrast is instructive. India faced comparable or greater demographic and sanitary challenges and prevailed through the competence and credibility of its state. Pakistan, with a smaller population and decades of international support, has failed to secure its own vaccinators. India’s vaccinators walked unescorted through its villages and slums, because the Indian state commanded the trust of its citizens and the security of its territory. That single difference explains much of why one neighbour defeated polio more than a decade ago and the other continues to incubate it.

Squandered Resources and the Limits of Donor Patience

Pakistan’s eradication effort has been sustained for three decades by the generosity of others: the Gates Foundation, Rotary International, the WHO, UNICEF, the Gulf states and Western governments. That patience is finite. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative faces a 30 per cent budget cut in 2026 and a funding gap that stood at US$1.7 billion to 2029 before the Abu Dhabi pledges reduced it to US$440 million. The initiative will curtail activities in lower-risk geographies and lean on efficiencies such as fractional dosing of inactivated vaccine.

Every year Pakistan fails to interrupt transmission, it consumes resources that could protect children against measles, diphtheria and malnutrition elsewhere, and it extends the period during which the entire world must keep vaccinating against a disease that should already be history. The GPEI strategy targets interruption of WPV1 by 2027. Pakistan’s record of missed deadlines, from the original global target of 2000 onwards, gives the international community little reason for confidence. A state that treats eradication as a donor-funded project, when it is a sovereign obligation to its own children, invites the fatigue that could prove fatal to the endgame.

Conclusion

The murders in Mohmand and the abductions in Tank are the latest chapter in a long narrative of state failure. Pakistan possesses an effective vaccine, an extensive workforce, a capable surveillance laboratory and the unwavering support of the international community. It lacks the security, credibility and administrative resolve to convert these assets into eradication. The virus endures where the state has abdicated, among children it has failed to protect, in communities it has failed to serve, and along frontiers it has turned into theatres of conflict.

The remedy lies within Pakistan’s reach. It requires the state to dismantle the militant ecosystem it once nurtured, to prosecute those who kill vaccinators, to confront the clerics and networks that peddle misinformation, to deliver roads, water and primary care to the districts it has neglected, to build a routine immunisation system worthy of the name, and to insulate polio cooperation with Afghanistan from its strategic quarrels. India has demonstrated that a determined state can defeat polio in the most daunting conditions. Until Pakistan summons comparable will, its children will remain the last hostages of a disease the world has otherwise defeated, and its neighbours, from Kabul to the Gulf and the Indian frontier, will continue to live under the shadow of its reservoirs. The burden of ending polio now rests squarely on Pakistan.

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Dr. Maheep
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Dr. Maheep is Director, Indian Perspective on Global Affairs (IPGA), and a leading analyst of India’s foreign policy and South Asian geopolitics. He earned his PhD in Arab and Islamic Studies. With more than a decade of teaching and research experience in International Relations and Global Politics, he contributes regularly on issues shaping national and global affairs.