Japan is now shifting from being a cautious ally to an independent power. Japan’s strategy of keeping a low profile in order to avoid being seen as taking the lead and provoking others in the region while the US is dealing with China is now no longer enough. Instead, as the US and China engage in an increasing rivalry, Japan is actively working to keep the region from becoming a binary contest between the two powers. To that end, Japan is strengthening its alliances with its traditional allies, such as the US, Australia, and the UK, as well as working with a wide range of other countries and organisations in the region, with ASEAN at the centre.
That Japan has to deal with a growingly assertive China and a vastly expanded Chinese Navy poses a great number of challenges for Japan. For a start, the country’s economy is greatly dependent on trade with China, with many Chinese components and materials currently entering into Japanese supply chains. Should Japan, for instance, move too strongly to express its solidarity with Washington against Beijing, the Japanese people would perceive their country’s alignment with the Americans against China to result in greatly heightened danger and severe economic loss. Moreover, on the other hand, should Tokyo stand too openly against Beijing and take part in military actions against the Chinese, then there is every likelihood of Japan causing destabilisation throughout the region with huge costs for the country’s development in the years ahead. This therefore necessitates for Tokyo to be as-balanced as possible between an official policy of firm counter-measures to aggression by others on the one hand, and an official position of maximum restraint which hopefully would be viewed as never aggressively anti other nations with all its counter-measures against any country or group of countries deemed by Tokyo to be increasingly threatening, with a further aim on the part of Japan for its foreign policy in being reassuring to all the nations of ASEAN.
The first step for Japan to become an ‘independent power’ is a military modernisation of defence capabilities. These capabilities need to be able to conduct long-range strikes, missile defence, cyber warfare and other new domains, as Japan has learned from the Ukraine crisis that in order to deter aggression, the armed forces of a country also need to be capable of long-endurance operations. The current National Security Strategy of Japan in this sense is a step in the right direction. In order to deter potential aggressors, Japan, together with the United States, as well as with Australia and the United Kingdom, is increasing the frequency and scope of joint military exercises and operations. This allows Japan’s military to become used to operating in coalition with other armed forces, as well as to demonstrate its capabilities to potential aggressors. However, from the point of view of such aggressors, the military buildup of Japan will likely be perceived as a containment policy. Southeast Asia is also likely to be concerned that an arms race could engulf the region and that increased militarisation could in itself lead to conflict. As a result, the military modernisation of Japan needs to be conducted very carefully.
The second pillar of the new Japan’s foreign policy, ASEAN, consists of 10 very different countries with different political and economic systems, spread across more than 3 million square kilometres of Southeast Asia from the Bay of Bengal in the west to the Pacific in the east and from the Indian Ocean in the south to the South China Sea in the north. The area is strategically important because it is home to some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, contains large amounts of fish and other marine resources, and is becoming an important market in its own right. But it is also an area of growing competition between external powers, not least between the U.S. and China. By providing a variety of assistance, including the provision of patrol boats, sharing of information to enhance maritime awareness, and financing for infrastructure, Japan can help to strengthen ASEAN as a grouping and enhance its members’ ability to act independently in the Indo-Pacific. Japan’s foreign policy does not have to be about putting pressure on other countries to take sides in the U.S.-China rivalry. Instead, it can help to reassure them of its support.
In order to bolster its strategic influence, Japan’s economic and technological policy must be geared towards supporting its regional diplomacy. Through its industry policies, Japan aims to make its own production of rare earths and high-value-added semiconductors less dependent on China. Defence export restrictions are being eased, and huge sums are being invested in areas such as AI, quantum computing, and cyber defence. Japan’s aim is to ensure that its economy is in a position to be resilient in the face of future challenges and is therefore strong enough to support its national interests. In doing so, however, it must avoid several pitfalls, and above all be pragmatic: While China is still an important trading partner for Japan, ASEAN economies have close trade relationships with both Beijing and Tokyo. The challenge for Japan is to build up sufficient strength for its own external policy without pressurising or even forcing countries in the region into choosing sides and becoming isolated.
The recalibration carries serious risks. Militarily, Japan could unintentionally intensify the security dilemma. Diplomatically, an assertive or Washington-centred posture could alienate ASEAN partners. Economically, abrupt diversification could undercut Japan’s growth. Domestically, constitutional constraints under Article 9 and public caution about remilitarisation continue to shape what is possible. These limits explain why Japan’s strategy must remain measured and regionally sensitive.
Thus, in order to maintain and enhance national interest and to prevent regional security from deteriorating, Japan must employ multidimensional approaches to strengthen deterrence without intentionally provoking its adversaries. First of all, Japan needs to enhance its maritime surveillance significantly and to effectively expand its domain awareness. As an important component of these efforts, Japan must further solidify and strengthen its cooperation with ASEAN states in order to share information effectively related to maritime domain awareness. By doing so, Japan must also encourage all ASEAN member states to play proactive roles in improving regional maritime domain awareness jointly. Furthermore, the areas of cyberspace and space that are expected to become central frontlines in future security competition must also be addressed by the defence policy of Japan. Maintaining and establishing crisis management communication channels effectively with China will also be extremely important. It is also important that economic security is aligned with defence policy in order to develop national strength effectively while avoiding excessive decoupling from China’s large markets.
Japan’s strategy to contain the danger of the region becoming a battleground between the US and China is an attempt to form a new regional order before it is too late. To this end, it is to strengthen, on the one hand, its military capability as a deterrent to potential aggression, while on the other hand, through diplomacy and economic measures, to win the understanding and support of ASEAN countries. It is in this sense that Japan is to function as a balancer and stabiliser of the region.
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Simon Hutagalung
Simon Hutagalung is a retired Indonesian Foreign Ministry diplomat and received his Master’s degree in Political Science and Comparative Politics from the City University of New York. He writes opinion pieces for Europeantimes and all opinions expressed in his article are his own.
