For decades, France and Germany have been at the heart of European politics. Their post-war reconciliation created the basis for a unified and peaceful Europe. Since then, their cooperation has driven European integration. Democracy, the rule of law and multilateralism are core values for both countries. Yet today the possibility of two far-right governments emerging in Paris and Berlin within a short space of time is no longer a remote scenario.
Marine Le Pen’s National Rally is currently the strongest force in French politics and is expected to compete in the 2027 presidential election. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) has meanwhile become a major force in German politics. A far-right turn in both countries would be more than a purely domestic political development and would put the European project to the test in a way it has not been for decades. For the first time in decades, Europe’s ability to act as a stabilizing factor would be severely put to the test.
However, while France is facing the threat of a far-right takeover of government, Germany’s far-right is currently facing several structural barriers to power. While these are by no means insurmountable, they are certainly more than enough to give France’s far-right a significant advantage in terms of the ability to translate votes into real policy changes.
While it is certainly true that winning an election is not, in and of itself, enough to immediately make a government authoritarian, different countries have different constitutional architectures which contain very different democratic checks, balances and legal constraints that can be undermined by sustained majoritarian executive pressure. Importantly for our purposes, the two main countries affected by this trend of far-right parties gaining power are very different in terms of their internal structures, and it is these differences that are to be the focus of the following section.
The greatest danger for European democracy is not that it will collapse overnight. Rather, democracy will slowly erode. First, it will all seem to be functioning as usual: the courts will hold sessions, there will be elections, and so on. But behind the scenes, the core values of a democracy are being slowly dismantled. A far-right leader could win an election and, based on the “unconditional” mandate of his supporters, start to implement his program aimed at subverting liberal democracy. He could, for example, attempt to undermine the independence of the judiciary, try to curb the freedom of the press, attempt to stifle civil society, and take away the rights of minority groups.
The greatest danger, however, is that of normalization. At first, the opponents of a far-right leader will be seen as enemies. Gradually, however, the institutions of a democracy will become increasingly politicized. In the end, the free press, the last check on the power of a leader, will be seen as an intolerable hurdle to his program. Slowly but surely, democratic culture will be eroded.
But beyond the two countries, a shared far-right program would be a catastrophe not only for France and Germany, but also for the European Union and the world. France and Germany have for decades been the driving force behind European integration. As the two biggest countries in the EU, they form the core of the EU’s foreign and security policy, with the largest part of the EU’s foreign and security policy initiatives being shaped by the two countries.
Within the EU, they are also the main architects of the rule of law policy, aimed at promoting democratic values and the rule of law in all EU member states. If France and Germany were to abandon these democratic values in their own countries, the moral authority of the EU to promote these values in the other member states
would be undermined to a large extent. And last but not least, the two countries are among the biggest economies in the world. A shared far-right program would therefore have far-reaching implications worldwide. It would weaken the EU’s relationship with NATO, it would undermine European strategic autonomy, and it would greatly reduce the EU’s diplomatic clout. Other member states of the EU would follow suit and engage in a series of transactional agreements with the biggest external actors, including the US, China and other emerging global actors.
However, simply fighting extremism is not enough. The mainstream parties have to prove that they are able to govern democratically and effectively. They have to addr
ess the root causes of voter alienation, such as concerns over immigration, decline, globalization, the downgrading of public services, and the growing distrust of politicians. This cannot be achieved by simply denouncing the far right as undemocratic. On the contrary, there has to be a successful attempt to win over the voters who are disaffected by current politics. This can only be achieved by providing effective and responsive government on employment, housing, security and the many other issues that affect people’s daily lives. Only then will it be possible to preserve the post-war system created to bring about the unification of Europe in its full democratic character.
Views: 15
Simon Hutagalung
Simon Hutagalung is a retired Indonesian Foreign Ministry diplomat and received his Master’s degree in Political Science and Comparative Politics from the City University of New York. He writes opinion pieces for Europeantimes and all opinions expressed in his article are his own.
