The EU’s response to the developments in the Strait of Hormuz is a telling example of the EU’s foreign policy challenge of “strategic ambiguity under the guise of principle”. As reported in July, the US had asked several EU countries to join a naval mission in the Strait of Hormuz to counter Iranian threats to shipping. Many EU countries initially refused to participate. Now after President Trump managed to send oil prices to their highest level in 5 years by threatening to impose sanctions on Iran and after his new round of tariffs on Chinese goods (which, we suspect, will hardly boost his re-election chances) triggered a new round of the trade war with China, several of those countries that initially declined to join the US-led naval mission have suddenly done a U-turn. They will now allegedly join the EU’s naval mission but with certain conditions, which remain unclear. The EU’s inability to provide meaningful leadership in this unfolding crisis is yet another sign that the EU’s ambition to become more global and achieve “strategic autonomy” is a largely symbolic one, masking the EU’s current inability to act as a unified and purposeful power.
More than one-fifth of the world’s oil supply passes through the Strait of Hormuz, a vital artery of the global economy. When President Trump asked America’s key allies to help promote freedom of navigation in the strait, France’s Emmanuel Macron and Germany’s Angela Merkel demurred, cautioning that any military action could be futile and premature, and could “spit in the face” of ongoing talks with Iran. Macron framed the French opposition to Trump’s call to arms in terms of Europe’s commitment to multilateralism, without saying who would police the Hormuz if America wasn’t doing it. Europe’s preference for talking things through rather than acting has been a feature of its foreign policy for years. In this case, it was a recipe for disaster and diplomacy itself became the security plan.
It was not the European aspiration for deterrence that was at issue, but rather the inability to provide real, effective deterrence. Without deterrence, diplomacy is reduced to nothing more than an act of surrender. No European participation in or leadership of a European security initiative was forthcoming. Europe shifted the risks of inaction to third parties, while at the same time remaining morally uninvolved. At home, the political class could simultaneously brand themselves as morally appalled by the murder of civilians while leaving others to bear the consequences of inaction abroad. Morals do not figure in the markets. As the amount of warfarin on merchant ships increased and premiums for the insurance of certain routes rocketed, Europe’s morality was suddenly challenged by economic interests.
The reversal in European capitals was an object lesson in the power of lobbies and the politics of member states. While a small number of governments remained firmly opposed to any naval intervention – partly because they fear a deterioration in relations with Tehran, but mainly because they do not believe such a move would achieve any significant goal and could have unpredictable consequences the pressure from shipping and energy lobbies was such that several began to dabble in the rhetoric of “limited naval intervention” (frequently couched in the “protection” terms of the US Congress to avoid any suggestion of participation in Washington’s plans for more than “humanitarian” purposes). It was all about optics. They wanted to be seen on the world stage while at the same time wishing to avoid any real or potentially serious commitments. What they ended up with and what they will probably continue with is an arrangement that amounts to nothing more than a symbol. It does not amount to a serious intervention that might perhaps achieve anything, nor has it done anything to enhance European influence in the negotiations between Iran and the IAEA/P5+1. What the experience has demonstrated instead is the European capacity for remote leadership and abdication of concrete responsibility for local developments.
This pattern is part of a larger pattern of instability. Europe still has differing views on what “strategic autonomy” means. For some, it is about being able to act independently. For others, it is a euphemism for not having to deal with unpleasant or difficult political decisions. In the Hormuz crisis, “autonomy” was used as the reason for the hesitant European reaction. The political divide between Atlanticism and the concept of “autonomy” led to European indecisiveness in a situation where Europeans needed unity and clear wording to prevent a diplomatic contradiction, rather than to exercise “autonomy”.
The cost of this ambivalence is far from being confined to the Gulf. In Washington, it confirms the conviction that Europe is an option-selective partner which always seeks to be excused from the cost of serious politics. In Tehran, it confirms the European lack of determination and inconsistency. And on the markets, ambivalence is confusing. And above all, Europe is losing further what it has lost to a large extent already, the respect of being a serious geo-political power. Influence is gained only by being prepared to act in situations where important interests are at stake.
There are many challenges on the horizon. The Middle East will be a period of great instability for years to come, and maritime security will remain a priority. Europe must learn from past mistakes so that the vicious cycle of denial, denial of reality, and grudging acceptance is not repeated. This reality undermines the trust that Europeans have in their ability to manage the uncertain future that lies ahead securely and successfully. The current model, in which Europeans benefit from U.S. guarantees while at the same time drifting away from U.S. leadership and policies, is unsustainable. The Atlantic Alliance will not endure if Europeans are able to benefit from the security afforded to North America, while they refrain from the solidarity, cooperation and unity that are necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the alliance. If they do not assume the necessary burden, they will be left defenceless and exposed to whatever challenges may arise.
It’s not about following Washington’s diktats or using words Europeans can barely understand in their foreign policy. What Europe needs is a security strategy which links together its foreign policy with an effective deterrence capacity – and that therefore demands political resolve, a budget for defence, and an assessment of the role of the EU. Europeans’ political leaders need to explain to their people that ‘strategic autonomy’ isn’t about renouncing truly strategic choices in favour of inaction but about being in a position to take tangible action to protect European interests.
In practice, what Europe has to do is to create the standing capacity of naval forces that would be ready for prompt use and where possible, through EU/NATO command structures. The role of the US should be that of a partner in such a military operation being carried out under US leadership, rather than playing a key role in determining the planning and organisation of such an operation. Europe has to wake up to the fact that playing games with America to acquire greater political and economic influence is often counterproductive.
The developments in the Strait of Hormuz should be a wake-up call. Europe has not managed to prevent war nor to have any influence on the developments. Once again, rhetoric and capacity do not match up. Europe can no longer afford to aim for strategic leadership in international politics while at the same time avoiding the risks that come with it. Security and leadership cannot remain purely rhetorical in a world becoming increasingly insecure.
Views: 30
Simon Hutagalung
Simon Hutagalung is a retired Indonesian Foreign Ministry diplomat and received his Master’s degree in Political Science and Comparative Politics from the City University of New York. He writes opinion pieces for Europeantimes and all opinions expressed in his article are his own.
