Although in the short term far-right parties could get enough seats to form an executive in France and in Germany, a comprehensive strategic alignment with Russia is not very likely to happen. What one needs to worry about is not so much a sudden, radical change in foreign policy but rather a gradual, subtle deterioration of foreign policy, i.e. a “strategic drift”. This type of development could weaken European foreign policy and its alignment with other policy areas. It would impact negatively on financial and military assistance to Ukraine and on transatlantic solidarity and coordination. Such a development would last for a long time and have far-reaching consequences for European foreign policy and for European security.
Populist foreign policy stands in stark contrast to the established foreign policy structures of the two countries. While the far-right parties currently gain most support from voters who are worried about immigration, concerned about inequalities in society and the decline of established parties, foreign policy is not a major concern for them. All of these grievances are, however, not translated into a demand to dismantle the foreign policy consensus of the post-war era and to orientate foreign policy towards autocratic regimes. Most voters who currently support the far-right parties do so in order to express their discontent with the current state of affairs and to channel their frustrations. As such, they do not translate into a conscious agreement by voters to dismantle the current foreign policy and to switch to an orientation towards Russia.
But even if the hard right were to ascend to the executive in France and Germany, a far-reaching alignment with Moscow would be improbable, to say the least. In the first place, there are the institutional constraints. In both countries there are a variety of checks on the executive which are designed to prevent any one individual or group from unleashing a radical revolution. Germany’s system of federalism, its tradition of coalition government, and its powerful Federal Constitutional Court all serve to restrain the kind of ideological excess that the hard right threatens to unleash. And even in France, where the President has a strong hand, several constraints on his power would prevent him from unleashing a radical foreign policy without a great deal of domestic opposition.
Although the ascension to government of far-right movements in France and Germany would not lead to an immediate, radical geopolitical shift towards the East, and to an alliance with Russia in particular, such a development would have far-reaching consequences and potentially enormous economic costs. For a long time, France and Germany have been part of the financial markets of the West and the corresponding economic structures, and would now have to switch to financial markets and structures dominated by Russia and the rest of the post-communist world. In addition, there are in place several existing sanction regimes against which it would be difficult to act in opposition. Supply of energy in the form of oil and gas comes from several different directions. Therefore, a policy of breaking with the West would lead to massive capital flight and, very quickly, the collapse of the new government’s legitimacy as a result of the associated economic crisis.
In reality, the ascension of far-right governments in France and Germany will not lead to a radical shift in foreign policy in the direction of Russia. First, a formal withdrawal of NATO protection or the signing of a military alliance with Russia is not going to happen. The greatest danger is a gradual erosion of European foreign policy, which in the end would lead to a collapse of the European foreign policy consensus and cause problems for European stability for many years to come. This erosion is not of a kind where there is an inability to agree a joint foreign policy, and thus each EU country cannot implement its own foreign policy. The greatest danger is that far-right governments would attempt to block all foreign policy decisions. At the same time, they would be trying to force each government to implement a foreign policy in line with the far-right ideology of the new government. Thus, a stalemate would be created in terms of EU foreign policy. In the end, far-right foreign policy could lead to a gradual erosion of a European foreign policy and thus to a crisis of EU foreign policy which would last for many years.
Rather than abandoning support for Ukraine and instead seeking an early diplomatic solution to the conflict in eastern Ukraine, far-right leaders in France and Germany would likely gradually erode support for Ukraine within the EU. Although they would not abandon support for Ukraine altogether, they would delay it and express it in a very ambiguous way. In this way, they would be able to erode support for Ukraine within the EU without Europe losing its commitment to supporting Ukraine.
While the Far Right takes over the executive in France and Germany, the relations with Washington will deteriorate gradually. Beyond the differences in terms of the financial burden of defence as well as of sanctions on Russia, there will be differences in terms of diplomatic approaches towards Moscow. Thus, a gradual but clear decline in operational coordination within the framework of NATO is to be expected. Although collective defence is not in question and formally is being maintained, in a crisis the lack of nerve on the part of Paris and Berlin will become visible to all. This will create increasing concerns on the part of the Eastern European countries and could lead them to negotiate bilateral defence agreements with other partners. This would lead to further fragmentation of Europe, creating additional challenges for European security.
However, this insidious erosion of security commitments can only be halted and prevented by devoting sufficient attention to strengthening the institutional frameworks of European countries and to clearly outlining and explaining the foreign policy goals of European countries. This also requires a review of the foreign policy processes of European countries with the aim of strengthening the institutional frameworks in order to prevent electoral changes in governments from being used to water down security commitments that have been entered into by previous governments. Foreign policy must be explained in such a way that it is made clear that foreign policy is not the preserve of a small group of ideologues, but is in fact a field of policy which is necessary in order to safeguard the interests of all citizens of European countries.
Views: 11
Simon Hutagalung
Simon Hutagalung is a retired Indonesian Foreign Ministry diplomat and received his Master’s degree in Political Science and Comparative Politics from the City University of New York. He writes opinion pieces for Europeantimes and all opinions expressed in his article are his own.
