Amidst the unprecedented spike in oil prices in the context of the ongoing conflict in West Asia it is indeed a revelation of the fact that conflict creates ‘silent profiteers’. These silent profiteers are not direct allies to any combatants. They do not broker peace. However, they stay at a distance by gaining economically nurturing their self-interest. While the states were grappling with the disastrous effects of missile strikes, there exists a specific class of beneficiaries, aka the ‘silent profiteers’, who are watching from a comfortable distance, monitoring fluctuations of crude oil prices, insurance premium prices, and weapon prices. These silent profiteers range from shipping companies and insurers to military contractors and state actors.
Russia was one of the state’s ‘silent profiteers’. Before the conflict, Russia’s oil revenues were collapsing. The export volumes of Russian oil in February 2026 were at 6.6 million barrels per day (bpd), the lowest level since 2022. Then Oil from the Gulf got stranded, and the daily tanker traffic from 130 plus shipping passing to almost zero, except for the movement of Iranian defense ships. Russia saw an opportunity to save itself from an economic downfall because of its conflict with Ukraine. Estimates suggest Russia could see additional revenues ranging from $45 billion to $97 billion by 2026 as a result of the conflict. “For our budget [the attack on Iran] is a big plus,” Kremlin TV propagandist Vladimir Solovyov told his viewers. “If Trump strikes Iranian oil fields, then, as unfortunate as it sounds, we [Russia] would become one of the few remaining [oil] producing countries…So we are gaining a trump card in this complex game,” he concluded. Hence, Russia became the silent profiteer.
Russia, despite its longstanding partnership with Iran and its self-proclaimed role as a counterweight to Western hegemony and in shaping geopolitics, has surprisingly responded to the conflict with restraint. This is not Russia’s usual behaviour. Russia has a military presence in Syria through 2024. This intervention collapsed when the Syrian rebels showcased aggressive offenses. The Russian mercenary group Wagner has been supplying Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) with missiles to aid their fight against the state’s army. Yet, it clearly lacks the will for military support for Iran. This is also due to its military and economic concentration in its efforts in its own conflict with Ukraine.
The chaos in West Asia also ensured that the non-state actors benefited from it. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and the missiles striking any ships that were entering it, led to the rerouting of the ships around the Cape of Good Hope. Well, this added to the increase in transit days, fuel cost, and the Freight rates surge. The unintended beneficiaries are shipping companies that already have their routes and infrastructures were bound to gain. The Conflict risk insurance premiums increased sharply; for instance, Lloyd’s of London is one of them benefiting due to any slightest escalation. Including the grey markets. Every conflict generates demand for weapons that cannot move through official channels. This is where the grey market steps in, where records are not kept.
This rent-seeking behaviour was also evident during the two World Wars and the subsequent conflicts. The military-industry complex, arms manufacturing companies that supply to all sides, remains the most commonly known example. Here, the arms manufacturers, in a way, fuel the conflict. As a matter of fact, this behaviour is not so evident with state actors because they have to be considerate about their legitimacy. Unlike the previous conflicts, Russia has distanced itself from engaging proactively by merely providing diplomatic support.
The conflict in West Asia brings out the pattern of conflicts fuelled by tangible resources and strategic geographies. These have created opportunities for rent-seeking behaviour by state and non-state actors, present outside the conflict zones. The international system does not address the rent-seeking behaviour of the states. The uncomfortable truth is that critical resources continue to remain geographically concentrated, and this is a reason for regions to be extremely vulnerable.
The conventional approach towards oil as a critical element to determine national power, the ongoing conflict confirms the same. As a matter of fact, the fluctuations in oil pricing have been a vantage point for Russia’s economy amidst a prolonged insecurity demanding arms and security partnerships. In other words. Russia, as a silent profiter along with non-state actors, gains in the short term, given the ongoing conflict. However, they are a barrier to the efforts to build a multipolar world order. In this context, the role of indian and its significant role in BCS becomes crucial and complex due to its intent to promote a multipolar and equitable global order. If the silent profiteers are ignored, it can lead to myriad divergences, especially in geopolitical positioning, which further limits the ability of India and BRICS to act cohesively in such a crisis.
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Krutika Reddy
Ms Krutika Reddy is a doctoral scholar at the School of Law, Governance & Public Policy, Chanakya University, specialising in public policy and India’s foreign policy with a focus on the Indo-Pacific. Her work examines strategic affairs, maritime geopolitics, and the complexities of policy formulation.
Chetan Singai
Prof.(Dr.) Chetan Singai is Dean at the School of Law, Governance and Public Policy, Chanakya University, Bengaluru.His research focuses on the intersections of constitutional values, legal frameworks, and policy design, with emphasis on institutional autonomy, accountability, and systemic reform. Internationally, he has collaborated with leading universities and think tanks across Europe, North America, and Asia. An active public intellectual, Dr. Singai regularly writes for national and international platforms, bridging academic research and policy action to create governance systems that are just, inclusive, and future-ready.
