The September 2026 elections in Germany’s states will be a critical test for the country and for Europe. The elections in Saxony-Anhalt, Berlin and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern will provide first indications of the development of the country’s most popular right-wing extremist party, the Alternative für Germany (AfD). The AfD’s increasing support at the polls poses the risk of it becoming a powerful force in German politics. If it successfully enters Germany’s government buildings, this will put the country’s political equilibrium to the test, weaken Germany as a stabilizing force within the European Union and provide external actors, above all Russia, with opportunities for exploitation of domestic fissures. One unknown quantity is the stance of Donald Trump on issues of NATO and of European security in general.
A first aspect is Germany’s political calendar and the state of the polls for the three German states scheduled to hold elections in September 2026. A breakthrough by the far-right party, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), in one or several of these elections could, for the first time, have the party establish a foothold for executive power. However, being the most popular party and actually holding power are two separate things, as Germany’s established parties have thus far managed to construct a political firewall that is meant to prevent them from collaborating with the far-right party. If the AfD were to obtain the largest number of votes in Saxony-Anhalt, it would, however, be capable of ushering in a fragile government, creating more problems than it solves in the several other states where elections will be held on the same day. Its ascendance would, above all, deepen social polarization. On the one hand, with the issue of migration in many cases becoming a proxy for identitarian (i.e., nationalist) issues; on the other, with the population growing increasingly skeptical of democratic practices that seem unable to deliver on their social and economic promises.
The power vacuum caused by the breakup of traditional party structures in Germany’s states will have the effect of weakening a stalwart of European cooperation. For decades, Germany and France have been two of the EU’s main pillars, ensuring the unity of the other European states on a range of issues, from economic management to climate policy, and in implementing sanctions against Russia. If, at a time when there is still war being waged in Europe, when there is growing uncertainty about energy supplies, and when there is an ever greater escalation of the external powers’ competition for influence within the European space, a country that has for years been acting as a guarantor of European cohesion and crisis management were suddenly to be rendered incapable of concentrating on the European long-term perspective, this would be a serious blow to the effectiveness of the European project as a whole.
For Russia, it would be useful to see the opposition in Europe further splinter and wane in public confidence in order to propagate the message to populations on the European periphery that the Western camp is descending into chaos and that unity is increasingly irrelevant to day-to-day challenges. The primary channel through which the AfD is susceptible to disinformation influence is the same set of grievances affecting voters that party members champion to a greater degree than many of their competitors (eg: higher inflation, declining living standards, increased migration, perceived regional neglect). As already noted, Russian propaganda will seek to make the assumed connection between these factors and the party’s sympathetic position on relations with Russia.
The uncertainty that has become characteristic of the foreign policy under US President Donald Trump further exacerbates the situation. By insisting that European countries have to take on more defense responsibilities while, at the same time, pressurizing Germany on trade, Trump’s unpredictable conduct forces Berlin to adapt to a new and challenging strategic environment. In order to be able to develop a strategy for its defense and for its economic development, Germany requires a constant signal from Washington. If this signal is lacking, Germany is exposed to a situation where it needs a strong, stable foreign policy more than ever.
Moreover, Germany’s attempt to establish new strategic partnerships, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, might be put to a halt. This region, above all, needs a stable European area as a partner in order to maintain a balance between the US and China in view of their rivalry for influence. The German government has already attempted to establish new relationships with regional organizations such as ASEAN. Asian nations are interested in maintaining a balance between the US and China. In addition, with Germany’s internal affairs being as volatile as they are at present, it is highly unlikely that it will be in a position to engage more in international affairs in the medium to long term.
Looking at the scenarios that may unfold in the elections scheduled for next September is interesting. Should the AfD achieve a historic victory in Saxony-Anhalt and therefore be able to take on the responsibility of governing the state, it would be possible for the first time in Germany’s post-war history for a far-right party to take on the role of leading a government. The party would gain many followers across Europe and become a highly appealing target for Russia’s propaganda machine. The second scenario is that the AfD does well in the elections but is not included in the government. The firewalls of the mainstream parties would be preserved, but in the run-up to the elections, fragile coalitions would be formed, which would be further polarized after the elections. This would lead to a section of the AfD supporters feeling cheated and enable them to radicalize further. The third scenario is that the AfD experiences negative results. The stability of Germany’s democratic system would be reinforced, but the structural problems, which include economic disparities as well as the problem of migration, would not disappear.
Strengthening democratic resilience, the mainstream parties in Germany must prevent a slide into undemocratic practices and maintain their firewall against cooperation with the AfD while, at the same time, turning to the many pressing challenges of democracy to address the economic, structural and migration-related concerns of voters and prevent them from drifting towards extremism. Civil society must harden its shield against disinformation from abroad by promoting civic education and raising awareness of current affairs through media literacy. The foreign policy of the country must be tailored to strengthen defense cooperation with France and other European states in order to ensure more stability in foreign policy than the currently often surprising and unpredictable policy pursued by the US President. Germany must, in addition, continue to pursue its strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region.
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Simon Hutagalung
Simon Hutagalung is a retired Indonesian Foreign Ministry diplomat and received his Master’s degree in Political Science and Comparative Politics from the City University of New York. He writes opinion pieces for Europeantimes and all opinions expressed in his article are his own.
